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1. INTRODUCTION 
As the 21st century approaches, environmental regulation around the world 
is slowly moving away from simple reliance on "command-and-control" 
rules toward approaches like taxes, tradeable permits, auditing and man-
agement schemes, and eco-Iabels. A salient feature of this shift is the 
increased use of self-regulatory, consumer-based, and voluntary mecha-
nisms to allow enterprises to move "beyond compliance." Several underly-
ing assumptions power the shift, including the exhaustion of the gains that 
can be realized through regulation alone, the realization that reducing pol-
lution and waste can often save money and make companies more efficient, 1 
and the conviction that market forces can be harnessed effectively for envi-
ronmental ends if the relevant actors have sufficient information. At the 
same time, industry has grown increasingly dissatisfied with government 
regulation, which is criticized as reducing competitiveness and costing jobs. 
Although environmental mechanisms relying on market forces originated 
in national arenas, in an era of globalized business, their proliferation has 
led quickly to attempts to harmonize such mechanisms on a regional and 
international level. International environmental law is still clearly domi-
nated by state-based treaty and "soft law," nonetheless, it increasingly inter-
sects, and must take into account, privately generated and implemented 
rules. These rules include private standards, codes of conduct, and agree-
ments on environmental measures to be carried out by specific enterprises, 
sectors, or firms. The genesis of these standards and rules is a complex 
mix of competitive pressures, a desire to avoid further national and inter-
national regulation and to roll back existing rules, a need to harmonize and 
Some of the material in this article was published in 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479 (1995). Many 
thanks to Professor Gunther Handl for editing suggestions and to Jennifer Haworth for 
research assistance. 
1 See e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, US CONGRESS, OTA-ITE-317, SERIOUS 
REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY 
3-6 (1986). 
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lO8 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
standardize national rules across markets, and genuine attempts to "green 
industry." As these private sources of standards and rules begin to be imple-
mented, they may well become increasingly less "voluntary," as pressure 
from consumers, suppliers, competitors, banks, insurance companies, and 
the like make them de facto mandatory in one or more major markets. 
This article looks at the impact of international, private voluntary stan-
dards in the environmental arena, with its significant ramifications for pub-
lic policy. It pays particular attention to the 14000 series standards now 
being developed by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO). It concludes that while market-enforced standards have a role to play 
in overall environmental-protection efforts, the ISO 14000 standards may 
add little and may, in several ways, set back efforts at corporate and indus-
trial environmental responsibility. The biggest limitations to the standard 
are the lack of any substantive performance targets and of any requirement 
to make public information on environmental performance. Compared to 
public international lawmaking efforts, and even to other private codes of 
conduct, the results of the private process are much more limited. 
Nonetheless, the process of elaborating the standards raises interesting 
questions for international environmental lawyers. In an age when the pub-
lic resources available for both standard-setting and, especially, implemen-
tation and enforcement of public international agreements are woefully 
inadequate, a system in which market forces and private capital are enlisted 
to pull toward compliance with norms of environmental protection would 
have distinct advantages. Moreover, a system of private, voluntary stan-
dards might allow for direct focus on the sources of environmental prob-
lems, especially industrial activity. Rather than rely on states to transfer the 
international rules and standards into national law and regulation and then 
apply these to regulated entities, a private, voluntary system would focus 
directly on the regulated entities themselves. Such a system could harness 
the global market to reward environmentally preferable behavior and dis-
courage that which is environmentally predatory. Finally, the process of 
creating private, voluntary standards raises questions about the effect of 
diversifying the direct actors in global rulemaking to include more than 
states, and about the impact of private standards on the current debates 
about trade and the environment. 
The regulatory paradigm of the 1970s, based on emissions limits that 
industry had to meet by installing scrubbers, filters, and other "end-of-the-
pipe" devices, is now widely recognized as inadequate.2 In its place, regula-
2 See generally Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L.R. 1333 (1985); BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET (1992); Stuart L. 
Deutsch, Setting Priorities: Principles to Improve Environmental Policy, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
43 (1992). While some commentators argue that "command and control" must remain as 
a base for other approaches, most agree that further improvements will require additional 
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ARTICLES I09 
tory agencies in many developed countries are moving slowly and tentatively 
toward a "pollution prevention" paradigm. Its purpose is to reduce pollution 
at the source before it is created by changing inputs into production and dis-
tribution processes. For example, the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has urged industry participation in voluntary toxics reduction (33/50 
program) and energy efficiency (green lights program), has begun integrating 
source reduction into agency regulations, works with specific industry sectors 
to minimize pollution through its "design for the environment" program, and 
provides grants for states for innovation in pollution prevention.3 It has also 
begun awarding the equivalent of eco-Iabels to "energy star" computers that 
use energy efficiently.4 The Common Sense, Environmental Leadership, and 
Project XL initiatives also fall to a greater or lesser degree under this rubric. 5 
Moreover, the United States has recently started using procurement to create 
a market in environmentally preferable goods; Executive Order 128736 
requires government agencies to use recycled paper, tires, and other such 
"environmentally preferable" goods wherever possible.? Japan, too, is mak-
ing greater use of such "pollution prevention" activity.s 
tools. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of 
Uniform Standards and "Fine Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1267-73 
(1985). 
3 US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS, 
E.P.A. POLLUTION PREVENTION ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 1993 (1994). The 1990 Pollution Prevention 
Act required EPA to set up an Office of Pollution Prevention and to work with states to 
develop innovative approaches to prevention. Pollution Prevention Act, 42 U.S.c. 
§§13101-131O9. For discussion of several promising approaches, see RETHINKING THE 
MATERIALS WE USE: A NEW Focus FOR POLLUTION POLICY (Ken Geiser & Frances H. Irwin 
eds., 1993). See generally Robert F. Blomquist, Government's Role Regarding Industrial 
Pollution Prevention in the United States, 29 GA. L. REV. 349 (1995), especially the list of 
sources on pollution prevention at note 231; Ken Geiser, The Unfinished Business of Pollution 
Prevention, 29 GA. L. REV. 473 (1995). 
4 US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS, 
supra note 3. 
5 The Common Sense Initiative involves developing a holistic approach to permitting based 
on industry sectors rather than pollutant or media. CSL Leadership Programs at EPA May 
Use ISO 14000 Management Standards, Official Says 26 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 257 (1995). The 
Environmental Leadership Program entails a promise from EPA not to perform routine 
enforcement inspections in exchange for the participating plants using audits and otherwise 
taking steps to ensure that they are complying with applicable environmental standards. 
Project XL goes further, with EPA offering to release businesses from some regulatory require-
ments if they exceed current environmental standards. Inspections at Plants to be Suspended in 
Environmental Leadership Pilot Program, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2448 (1995). 
6 Executive Order 12873, 3 C.F.R. 659 (1993 Comp.). 
7 "Environmentally preferable" means "products or services that have a lesser or reduced 
effect on human health and the environment when compared with competing products or ser-
vices that serve the same purpose." Id. §201. The Executive Order creates a Federal 
Environmental Executive within EPA to oversee federal agency compliance with the order, to 
develop criteria for preferable products, and to disseminate information on waste prevention 
and reduction and market sources of recycled or environmentally preferable goods. Id. §301. 
8 Japan in 1993 promulgated a new Fundamental Act for Environment stressing prevention 
of environmental pollution and energy conservation. Pollution prevention agreements between 
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IIO YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
The European Community (EC) is moving toward similar market- and 
information-driven environmental incentive programs. The EC's Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme combines a multi-media, sectoral 
approach with a commitment to broadening the range of policy instruments 
and to increased use of non-regulatory mechanisms. 9 The proposed 
Integrated Pollution Control Directive and the eco-labelling and eco-audit 
schemes throughout the European Union (EU) are also part of this shift. In 
several European countries, governments have entered into voluntary agree-
ments with one or more industrial sectors to reduce or eliminate certain 
harmful substances or practices.lO These agreements act like private con-
tracts, enforceable under civil law, and contain elements of industry self reg-
ulation and self monitoring subject to outside verification. Such sector-wide 
voluntary agreements are now being discussed on an EU-wide level, and 
there may shortly be pan-European voluntary agreements between the 
European Commission and certain industrial sectors. I I 
This article, while focusing on the ISO 14000 series standards, discusses 
two kinds of private, voluntary standards. The most developed and preva-
lent are process-focused environmental management and auditing stan-
dards. These are generally applicable to any kind of industry and focus on 
setting up and monitoring appropriate systems; no specific substantive lim-
its or prohibitions are involved. Environmental improvement is assumed to 
result from increased internal knowledge and a general commitment to con-
tinual improvement. In some cases, internal knowledge is combined with 
requirements for public disclosure of impacts, on the theory that disclosure 
industry and local government have been in place for a number of years. Shiro Kawashima, A 
Survey of Environmental Law and Policy in Japan, 20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 231, 248, 
261 (1995). Amendments to Japan's Waste Disposal Law stress source reduction, while the 
Law for Promoting the Utilization of Recycled Resources designates certain industries, prod-
ucts, and by-products for recycling and provides incentive schemes for companies and indi-
viduals to recycle. Misutsune Yamaguchi, Japanese Companies and the Environment, 24 L. 
JAPAN 62, 75-76 (1991). 
9 See, e.g., the emphasis in the Fifth Environmental Action Programme on market incen-
tives, on actions targeted at industry, and on broadening the range of instruments. COMMISSION 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1993 OJ C 138, TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY; EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY PROGRAMME OF POLICY AND ACTION IN RELATION TO THE ENVIRONMENT AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (FIFTH ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PROGRAMME) (May 17, 1993); see 
also the proposed Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control directive, which would estab-
lish a multi-media, pollution-prevention based approach to industrial pollution problems. 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1995 OJ C 165, AMENDED PROPOSAL FOR A 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE CONCERNING INTEGRATED POLLUTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL (May 15, 
1995, COM/95/88 final, published July 1, 1995). The use of voluntary measures in the latest 
proposal for a carbon tax might be another example. 
10 See discussion infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
II Jesper Jorgensen, European Commission, DG XI, Foreseen Future Initiative from the 
European Commission Concerning the Use of Negotiated Agreements in the Field of 
Environmental Policy, speech given at Conference on Voluntary Approaches for Mitigating 
Energy-Related C02 Emissions, (Oct. 30-31, 1995) (transcript on file with author). 
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ARTICLES III 
will lead to additional pressure for improvement. The article first briefly 
considers under this heading corporate codes of conduct. It then turns to 
the European Management and Auditing System (EMAS) regulation. 
Finally, this section analyzes the emerging environmental management 
standards of the ISO 14000 series. 
A second group of voluntary standards focuses on products and the 
processes associated with their production, use, and disposal. These stan-
dards attempt to reward goods exhibiting environmentally preferable traits 
in their production, distribution, use, and disposal with an eco-Iabel that 
will induce consumers to buy the environmentally superior product. The 
dominant form of eco-Iabelling does not, by definition, extend to all prod-
ucts, but rather aims at the top 10-20%, hoping to use consumer preference 
to raise standards for the entire product line. Again, eco-Iabelling programs 
originated within a number of different states, but harmonization efforts are 
currently underway in the ISO and among the labelling programs them-
selves. 
The process by which both these types of global standards are being 
crafted and debated raises a number of interesting issues about their rela-
tionship to public international law. The article focuses on the innovative 
features of standard-setting within the ISO and places them within a larger 
context that includes opening up rulemaking processes once reserved exclu-
sively to states to multiple interests. It then looks at the limitations of the 
process used to draft the ISO 14000 standards, and compares the standards 
to publicly generated rules on related topics. 
A final section considers the possibilities for effectiveness of private, vol-
untary standards. It first looks at how the standards may be used, and espe-
cially at how they intersect with existing international trade regimes. It 
concludes that process-focused management standards will be insufficient 
and that substantive standards will eventually prove necessary. The article 
looks to the existing precedents in the area of company- or plant-based 
standards that focus on substantive changes and limits on processes, mate-
rials, and emissions. These standards are generally sectorally based and 
have affected mostly industry groups characterized by a small number of 
large companies, a highly polluting process, and high public visibility. 
Finally, the article discusses the potential advantages of producer- or 
product-based standards and explores the necessary preconditions for such 
standards to evoke compliance. 
II. PROCESS-FOCUSED MANAGEMENT AND AUDIT PROGRAMS 
A. Business Codes of Conduct 
Several business groups have supported international standards for envi-
ronmental performance. In 1991, the Business Council for Sustainable 
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II2 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Development (BCSD)12 suggested creating international standards that 
would allow businesses in various sectors to measure their environmental 
impacts according to comparable criteria. 13 The BCSD's initiative dove-
tailed with various other efforts at corporate environmental responsibility. 
In 1989, a coalition of socially responsible investors in the United States 
published the "Valdez Principles," a set of voluntary commitments intended 
to be used by investors to favor environmentally responsible corporations. 
Corporations that signed on to the principles were supposed to: minimize 
pollutants, resource and energy use, and waste generation; inform con-
sumers of the environmental impacts of their products and services; com-
plete and make public an annual self-audit of environmental progress and 
work toward creating independent environmental audit procedures to be 
made available to the public; and establish management and Board struc-
tures to oversee environmental performance. 14 
Two years later, the International Chamber of Commerce created the 
Business Charter for Sustainable Development in response to recommenda-
tions in the 1987 Bruntland Commission Report. ls The Charter's principles 
include: commitment to a process of environmental assessment and 
improvement of policies, programmes, and performance, including applying 
the same environmental criteria internationally; design and operation of 
facilities and activities to use energy and materials efficiently and sustain-
ably, minimize adverse environmental impact and waste generation, and 
dispose of residual wastes safely; application of the precautionary principle; 
and a promise to pressure suppliers to comply with similar principles. 
Charter companies must also measure environmental performance, conduct 
regular audits, and "provide appropriate information" to the public. To 
join, companies simply sign up; public pressure is the only means of moni-
toring compliance with the commitment. The Global Environmental 
12 In 1994, the BCSD merged with the World Industrial Council for the Environment to 
form the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. New Organization Formed 
From Merging of Business Groups Focused on Environment, 17 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 1011 
(1994). 
13 STEPHAN SCHMIDHEINY & BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, CHANGING 
COURSE: A GLOBAL BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992); 
Stephan Schmidheiny, The Business Logic of Sustainable Development, 27 COLUM. J. WORLD 
Bus. 18 (1992). 
14 The Valdez Principles were eventually renamed the CERES Principles. 1990 CERES 
GUIDE TO THE VALDEZ PRINCIPLES, in JOHN R. SALTER, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: LAW AND PRACTICE 257, App. 10 (1992). 
15 The Charter was one of several projects by European and North American business lead-
ers at the May 1990 Bergen Conference "Action for a Common Future," which was itself a 
follow-up' to the Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(Bruntiand Commission), OUR COMMON FUTURE, which established the concept of "sustainable 
development" as a goal. SALTER, supra note 14, at 262, App. 11. Almost 500 companies world-
wide have now signed onto the Charter. 
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ARTICLES 1I3 
Management Initiative (GEM I) established similar principles of "sustain-
able development."16 
Sectoral codes of conduct also appeared. The best-known is the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association (CMA) "Responsible Care" program, which 
binds all CMA members.n The Responsible Care movement began in the 
1980s in Canada, as a chemical industry response to negative public per-
ceptions regarding the chemical industry's seeming indifference to environ-
mental issues, especially after the Bhopal disaster. IS Companies must sign 
on to 10 guiding principles and six codes of management practices, which 
set performance objectives in the areas of emergency response, pollution 
prevention, process safety, distribution of chemicals, employee health and 
safety, and product stewardship. 19 These must be implemented by all CMA 
members by 1999. A 15-member public advisory panel counsels the CMA, 
and member companies gauge their progress through yearly self evalua-
tions.20 
Adherence to the principles and codes is theoretically assured because 
noncompliance may lead to expulsion from the industry trade association, 
with the associated public-relations problems. Critics argue, however, that 
the codes are written so broadly that almost anything can fit into them, that 
only three of the six codes have performance indicators and that even those 
merely reflect existing domestic legal obligations. Further, critics have 
pointed out the insufficiency of self evaluation for monitoring progress. To 
meet that criticism, the CMA in June 1994 approved the use of an experi-
mental third-party verification system, but to evaluate only the management 
and assessment systems themselves, rather than the actual results of imple-
mentation.21 Finally, those critical of the CMA approach questioned the 
lack of any requirement to disclose the results of evaluations, and the non-
site-specific nature of the data released by the industry to show improve-
ment.22 
16 As of December 1995, 26 multinational firms in the United States had signed GEMI. 
GEMI Companies Honored at Environmental Champions Award Ceremony, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 
4, 1995 available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS file. See also Anthony D. Cortese, 
Environmental Laws Under the Nation States, in TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ITs 
IMPACT ON CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 44 (Eric J. Urbani et al. eds., 1994). 
17 The CMA issued the Responsible Care Program in 1991 as a way to assuage public con-
cerns about chemicals and the industry. In addition to rather general principles regarding safe 
chemical development, production, transportation, use, and the reporting of chemical-related 
hazards, the Program includes a public advisory panel and a code of management practices 
with specific management objectives. See Salter, supra note 14, at 268, App. 12. European pro-
ducers adhere to a similar set of principles. 
18 The Responsible Care Movement, EUR. ENVTL. L. REV., July 1993, at 189. 
19 Lois R. Ember, Responsible Care: Chemical Makers Still Counting on it to Improve Image, 
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, May 29, 1995, at 10, 12. 
20 !d. at 11. At times, CMA calls in third-party evaluators to validate the self evaluations. 
21 CMA Gives Green Light to Third-Party Audits, CHEMICAL WEEK, July 6-13, 1994, at 38. 
Compare to the similar requirements and limitations in the ISO standard, discussed below. 
22 Ember, supra note 19, at 16. 
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II4 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
These industry-based initiatives were soon followed by more specific pro-
posals in the areas of environmental management and auditing systems. The 
EC took the lead in trying to replace the various private schemes with a sin-
gle set of criteria and requirements that would allow industries with opera-
tions in more than one country to avoid duplicating efforts and costs. The 
result was the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme. Although EMAS was 
established through government regulation, it is voluntary and relies wholly 
on market mechanisms for effectiveness.23 The existence of EMAS, in turn, 
provided part of the impetus for a more encompassing effort at creating an 
international environmental management standard. That effort has been 
housed in the ISO.24 
B. The Eco-Management and Audit Scheme of the European Union 
As part of the Fifth Environmental Programme's effort to encourage indus-
try to playa pro-active, cooperative role in environmental protection, EU 
Council Regulation 1836/93 establishes a voluntary system for using inter-
nal management and auditing systems to achieve continuous improvement 
in environmental performance. While the regulation dates from 1993, it only 
became effective as of April 1995.25 It is to be revisited and possibly revised 
in five years; at that time the EU will decide whether to make it compul-
sory. 
Companies may register industrial sites participating in the program and 
publicize the fact of registration. According to EMAS' backers, participa-
tion in the program will benefit a company through improved public image, 
better relationships with employees, planners, regulators, and the local com-
munity, and through the possibility of increased market share, cost avoid-
ance (for accidents, insurance premiums, fines, and the like) and cost 
reduction.26 
EMAS registration is granted on a site-specific basis. While companies 
may be headquartered anywhere in the world, only those sites physically 
located in an EU member state may be registered. The regulation requires 
a company seeking registration for one or more industrial sites to carry out 
an environmental review; to elaborate and implement an environmental pol-
icy, environmental objectives, and programs; to carry out an environmen-
tal audit; to publish a statement of findings; and to submit to outside 
verification. The initial environmental review must consider 11 parameters 
23 Council Regulation 1836/93, Establishing a European Eco-Management and Audit 
Scheme, 1993 O.J.(L 168) I [hereinafter EMAS]. 
24 The ISO 14000 series specification and guidance standards are, as of this writing, in draft 
form only; the first standard is expected to be approved by mid-1996. 
25 PETER WILSON, THE COMMUNITY Eco-MANAGEMENT AND AUDIT SCHEME: AN OVERVIEW, 
PROGRESS TO DATE AND CURRENT ISSUES, EC Commission, DG XI.E.I, Oct. 18, 1995, at 4 (on 
file with author). Implementation to date of EMAS is discussed following note 31. 
26 KPMG ENVIRONMENTAL ADVISORS, EMAS, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 4-7 (1995). 
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ARTICLES lIS 
set out in an Annex to the regulation, including actual and potential envi-
ronmental impacts to air, water, land, and natural resources; energy use;-
materials and goods used; waste disposal; accidents; and the potential 
effects of new products and new or changed production processes. The envi-
ronmental performance of contractors, sub-contractors, and suppliers and 
the need to influence and control their activities must also be addressed. 
Based on this review, each site is to have a register of significant environ-
mental effects. 
Based on the results of the review, an environmental policy, objectives, 
and programmes must be developed and implemented. The policy must 
commit to a series of good management practices, including preventing and 
eliminating pollution where feasible, assessment and monitoring, and pro-
viding information and advice to the public and customers. The objectives 
are to be quantifiable (where practicable), time-limited, and periodically 
reviewed. All legislative, regulatory, and policy requirements are to be 
recorded; performance is to be monitored and documented; and procedures 
must be in place for correcting non-performance. 
Three mechanisms ensure the integrity of the EMAS process. First, regis-
tration of each site is conditioned on periodic auditing to ensure compliance 
with company policy, objectives, and programmes as well as with relevant 
regulatory requirements. Second, a public environmental statement must be 
prepared. The statement must include a summary of figures on pollutant 
emissions, waste generation, use of raw materials, energy and water, noise, 
and other significant effects, an assessment of significant issues, a description 
of company environmental policy and of the program and management sys-
tems at the particular site, and the name of the accredited environmental 
verifier. Thus, local community and environmental pressure groups will have 
enough information to monitor a site's current situation and evaluate 
improvements. Third, to obtain registration, each site must be checked by an 
external "verifier" independent of the auditor. The verifier must assure that 
all reviews, audits, and other elements of the scheme have been properly car-
ried out, that the data provided in the environmental statement is reliable 
and complete, and that the site meets all EMAS requirements. 
Member states participate in EMAS through the designation of the com-
petent body to process applications for registration, and through an accred-
itation body that sets the standards and grants accreditation to professional 
verifiers. Once the validated environmental statement is produced, it is up 
to a competent body designated by each member state to grant the site reg-
istration. The designation of a competent body has occasionally proven 
controversial; in Italy, for example, there was some debate as to whether it 
should be housed within the Environment or Industry ministries.27 Once a 
27 Interview with Manfredi Bellati, DG XI (Directorate-General on Environment, Nuclear 
Safety, and Civil Protection) of the EC Commission, in Brussels, Belgium (Nov. 10, 1995). 
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116 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
site has been registered, it maintains the registration through simplified 
annual statements combined with a three-year audit cycle. If the registra-
tion authority decides a site no longer complies, or if domestic enforcement 
authorities inform the designated competent body that the site is not in 
compliance with relevant environmental legislation, it may be de-registered. 
The accreditation body is to identify the requirements for individuals and/or 
companies and approve those that can act as verifiers. As of October 1995, 
EMAS accredited verifiers had been approved in only the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and Germany, although some 200 applications for accreditation 
had been received.28 Verifiers can operate in any member state, but must be 
subject to supervision by the member state system in which they perform 
verification activities. After some initial confusion regarding the precise role 
of verifiers, the European Commission is preparing guidance documents on 
criteria for accrediting verifiers and on their activities. 
The designation of both competent bodies and accreditation bodies has 
been slower than expected. By late 1995, three states had still not designated 
the appropriate national authorities, although all were expected to do so by 
early 1996.29 Moreover, companies with Europe-wide operations com-
plained that some of the advantages of a region-wide scheme were under-
mined by potential inconsistencies caused by leaving criteria for verifiers up 
to each state, or even to sub-national entities. 30 The Commission has an 
agreement with the European Organization for Testing and Certification to 
iron out the differences, but harmonized criteria are still some way of[31 
By October 1995, five UK sites, two Danish sites, and six German sites 
had registered under EMAS. Chemical companies, already familiar with 
auditing and management schemes from industry-wide codes, are particu-
larly well represented. To date, all registrations have been of large and 
medium-size companies. The cost and complexity of registration is one 
potential limit to the scheme, which may end up favoring large over small 
businesses. The Commission, well aware of this criticism, has prioritized 
outreach to small business, funding 32 pilot projects with some 400 busi-
nesses for training, informing, and incorporating eco-management princi-
ples into the operations of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
While Commission officials are optimistic that registrations will pick up 
as the scheme becomes better known, some companies seem to be delaying 
28 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, LIST OF EMAS ACCREDITED VERIFIERS 
(updated to Oct. 25, 1995); WILSON, supra note 24, at 14. 
29 Officials Say Greece, Spain, Portugal Still Lack Administrative Base for EMAS, 18 INT'L 
ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 862 (1995). 
30 According to Spanish law, for example, each of 17 autonomous communities has the right 
to designate its own bodies for accreditation of verifiers, although in practice almost all will 
probably rely on a national agency. 
31 Only Half of EU Member States Prepared for Participation in Eco-Management and Audit 
Scheme, 18 INT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA), Apr. 24, 1995, at 310. 
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until the relationship between EMAS and other national and international 
eco-management standards has been clarified. If one set of procedures and 
verifications can serve several registration schemes, the costs involved will 
decrease. The relationship between EMAS and other standards has been the 
most contentious issue in implementing the standard. In addition, the desire 
to meet the requirements of EMAS has been a driving force in the devel-
opment and scope of international standards. 
Article 12 of EU Council Regulation 1836/93 allows companies imple-
menting and certified to national, European, or international standards to 
be deemed to meet all or part of the EMAS requirements under certain con-
ditions. First, the European Commission must have recognized the stan-
dards through the body of member state officials set up under Article 19 of 
EMAS. Second, the standards must be certified by a body, like a national 
standards organization, recognized by the member state where the site is 
located. Recognition of several already-developed national standards on 
environmental management, for example the British BS7750, has been com-
plicated by the unwillingness of some member states to allow national stan-
dards to play any role in EMAS. Thus, the Commission delayed recognizing 
existing British, Irish, and Spanish standards as satisfying the Article 12 cri-
teria until February 1996.32 Eventually, the Commission hopes to publish 
equivalency guidelines highlighting areas of correspondence between differ-
ent national standards and EMAS. Companies would then have to verify 
only those requirements of EMAS not already certified to the national stan-
dard. 
The relationship between EMAS and the global environmental manage-
ment standards being developed by the International Organization for 
Standardization is complex and still unresolved. The following section first 
discusses the development and content of the ISO 14000 standards, and 
then looks at that relationship. 
C. The ISO 14000 Series Standards 
The International Organization for Standardization was founded in 1946 to 
promote international standards to facilitate global trade. It is a federation 
of 100 national standards bodies, each of which is that body "most repre-
sentative of standardization in its country". 33 The member organizations 
provide most of the financing, staffing, and administrative and technical 
32 Commission Recognizes National Standards under EMAS, European Commission Press 
Release IP/96/113, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Feb. 9, 1996. Recognition of national stan-
dards took several years, and came only after an early Commission attempt to do so failed. 
Interview with Manfredi Bellati, supra note 27. According to another source, "Germany is 
opposed in principle to the idea of an optional route to EMAS registration, while the Austrians 
are said to be holding out for ISO 14000 to be adopted." ENDS REPORT 247, Aug. 1995, at 
38. 
33 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, MEMENTO 3 (1995). 
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118 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
services for the committees. Each national committee determines its own 
composition; while some national committees are almost entirely composed 
of private interests, others have substantial government representation. The 
organization's complex structure is based on technical committees, which 
may, as needed, establish their subcommittees and working groups. Each 
national group delegates its own members and decides the positions they 
will take in the technical committees and subcommittees. The national 
groups may form technical advisory groups to develop unified national 
positions on proposed standards; these may, in turn, subdivide into sub-
technical advisory groups. By the beginning of 1994, there were 182 techni-
cal committees, 630 subcommittees, 1,918 working groups and 24 ad hoc 
study groups. Each technical committee or subcommittee has a secretariat, 
while the less formal working groups have conveners.34 The ISO's head-
quarters in Geneva has a Central Secretariat that handles voting proce-
dures, a General Assembly, a governing Council, and a Technical Board. 
ISO's work products are known as International Standards. To date, 
there are 2,649 standards, mostly in the fields of mechanical engineering, 
basic chemicals, non-metallic materials, information processing, graphics, 
and photography.35 The process of creating a standard starts with the ISO 
Council's forming a technical committee. The members of the technical 
committee organize the work into its component parts, assigning tasks to 
subcommittees and working groups. Participants negotiate and discuss the 
drafts in the various subcommittees and working groups as well as in the 
national technical advisory groups. The various subcommittee and working 
group drafts are eventually integrated into a committee draft that must be 
approved by consensus. After the technical committee approves the draft, 
it becomes a "draft international standard," and is circulated to the entire 
ISO membership for a vote. A substantial majority must approve the stan-
dard for it to be published as an international standard. 
ISO-approved documents may be either specification standards or guid-
ance documents. Specification standards frame the standards' requirements 
and form the basis for third-party certification or verification. Guidance 
documents set out suggested methods and approaches for achieving the 
standard but do not themselves serve as the basis for certification. A given 
area may include a specification standard and a number of related guidance 
documents and aids to implementation. 
34 While conveners oversee the actual draft standard writing at the working group level, the 
committees and subcommittees, headed by secretariats, are the bodies which promulgate the 
draft international standards which members vote on. See id. at 5. See also OFFICE OF 
POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXIeS, US EPA, ISO 14000: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 1 (1995). 
35 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO IN FIGURES 3 (1994). 
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(i) The Genesis of the ISO 14000 Series Standards 
Several factors promoted ISO's involvement in environmental management 
standards. EMAS' approval led to complaints that global businesses were 
going to be subject to multiple, inconsistent sets of management and audit-
ing standards, resulting in calls for a global standard to encompass and har-
monize national and regional ones. The proliferation of private business 
codes of conduct led to similar calls for streamlining and harmonization. In 
addition, ISO affiliates were more willing to undertake the task because of 
the success of a related set of management standards, the ISO 9000 series 
quality control standards. 
The ISO 9000 series quality control standards, published in 1987, contain 
guidelines for companies to use in implementing quality assurance systems36 
and in specifying contract requirements for suppliers and subcontractors.37 
The explicit goal was to harmonize quality assurance requirements to facil-
itate international trade. 38 ISO 9000 represented a departure from conven-
tional ISO work-products in two ways. First, ISO 9000 was the first 
international standard built more or less from scratch, rather than through 
harmonizing existing national standards. While both the United States and 
Europe had quality control standards of their own, there was no single 
"US" or "German" standard to bring to the table. 39 Second, the standards 
were applicable to a wide range of industries and services, rather than a 
specific product, process, or plant. 
The ISO 9000 series quickly became a de facto requirement for doing 
business in Europe and other parts of the world. Companies required proof 
36 The ISO 9004 Quality Management Guidelines (9004, 9904-2, and 900-3) provide guid-
ance for a firm wishing to use an ISO 9000 quality system for its inherent benefits, but not nec-
essarily for certification. PERRY L. JOHNSON, ISO 9000: MEETING THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS 33 (1993). 
37 ISO 9001, 9002, and 9003 apply to firms that seek ISO 9000 registration for legal or con-
tractual purposes. Id. at 32-33. 
38 Several provisions of ISO 9000 pointed the way toward more specific environmental man-
agement standards. ISO 9004 §3.3 declares that "in order to be successful, a company must 
offer products or services that ... comply with statutory (and other) requirements of society." 
These include "environmental considerations, health and safety factors, and conservation of 
energy and materials." Furthermore, the standard requires analysis of all phases in the life cycle 
of a product and processes, from initial identification of market needs to final satisfaction of 
requirements, including product design, production, packaging, storage, and disposal or recy-
cling at the end of useful life. It provides for an internal audit of quality systems and periodic 
external evaluation. The standard requires that independent professional "registrars" evaluate 
a company's quality-control procedures and certify its compliance with the standard. Both the 
life-cycle assessment and internal/external audit approaches to quality have been incorporated 
into the ISO's current environmental standard setting. Thus, industry was already familiar with 
these concepts when it encountered them in an environmental context. 
39 In the United States, early quality-control efforts were developed first by the Defense 
Department for military contractors, and by the "Big Three" automakers as proprietary sys-
tems for their suppliers. In Britain as well, quality control evolved from military specifications, 
but was promoted for the private sector by the British government. JOHNSON, supra note 36. 
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through an independent, registered certifier that their suppliers and sub-
contractors complied with the standard.40 ISO certification was required for 
certain regulated products covered by EC directives. ISO certification was 
also required in order to sell to government-controlled entities throughout 
Europe.41 In the United States, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Defense 
Department began harmonizing their quality requirements to those of ISO 
9000.42 The expanding use of the standard led US-based corporations to 
complain that certification was more expensive and difficult for them.43 The 
difficulties arose in part because no accredited independent certifier was 
based in the United States, and in part because the EC would only accept 
its own certifiers.44 Some viewed the ISO standard, and especially the 
requirement for outside certification, as a non-tariff trade barrier designed 
to favor European industry.45 Others resented what they perceived as a 
European bias to the standard. These concerns, and a heightened awareness 
of the ISO standards' power to influence market behavior, have colored the 
process of designing the ISO 14000 series environmental standards. 
A technical committee, TC 207, was officially launched in October 1992 
with a mandate to develop standards in the areas of environmental man-
agement systems, environmental auditing, environmental performance eval-
uation, labelling, life-cycle analysis, and environmental aspects of product 
standards. Almost from the start, the environmental management system 
(EMS) standard has been the focus of much of the attention. In part this is 
because the EMS standard will be the certification standard, while those in 
40 JOHNSON, supra note 36 at 8-9. 
41 See Charles W. Thurston, Quality is a Global Affair: Worldwide Adoption of International 
Organization for Standardization Program. Quality '94,246 CHEMICAL MARKETING REP. SR-lO 
(1994); Johnson, supra note 36, at 9; David Ong-Yeoh, Malaysia: Play by EU Rules to Enter 
its Mart. Investors Told, Bus. TIMES (Malaysia), Dec. 7, 1994, at 2 (companies must seek ISO 
9000 certification to meet certain aspects of the essential requirements on imports into Europe). 
42 See Thurston, supra note 41. 
43 US-based corporations, according to a 1993 survey by Mobil Oil, accounted for only 
4.7% of all certifications to the standard. British companies accounted for 62.5%, other 
European companies for another 21.5%, and those from Australia and New Zealand repre-
sented 7.1% of all certifications. Id. at 14. 
44 See JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 147. Part of the problem is that the US government, unlike 
European governments, has no official accreditation for ISO 9000 registrars, so that compa-
nies in other countries are less willing to accept the certifications of U.S. registrars. The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of developing an official 
accreditation process that would meet at least the requirements for "regulated products." In 
addition, ISO itself has formed a group to develop a single, globally recognized registration 
system. Thurston, supra note 41, at 12-14. 
45 As noted above, many more European companies are certified to the standard, in part 
because of the relative ease and lower costs of accreditation. Only some 2,000 US companies 
have registered, compared with some 28,000 European ones. Businesses Get Chance to 
Participate in Development of New Environmental Management Systems Standards, PR 
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS file. 
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other areas will be merely guidance documents,46 and in part because the 
EMS standards have been on a fast track, since a global standard needed 
to be ready quickly to fit into the EMAS timetable. From 1992 through 
mid-1995, four large meetings and many more small ones took place to 
thrash out the content of an EMS standard. In June 1995, the technical 
committee approved a Draft International Standard for Certification, ISO 
14001, and an accompanying guidance document on EMS, ISO 14004, and 
sent them out for voting to the entire ISO membership. If they are 
approved, the final standards should be in place by mid- or late 1996.47 
(ii) The Environmental Management System Standard 
Under the draft ISO EMS standard, an organization's environmental man-
agement system shall consist of an environmental policy defined by top 
management, which must include a commitment to continual improvement, 
to compliance with relevant law and other requirements, and to preventing 
pollution, and must contain a documented framework for setting and 
reviewing environmental objectives and targets. It shall include a 
procedure to identify the environmental aspects of [the organization's] activities, 
products, and services that it can control and over which it can be expected to have 
an influence in order to determine those which have or can have significant impacts 
... and to ensure that the aspects related to these significant impacts are considered 
in setting its environmental objectives.48 
The organization must then define environmental objectives, specific targets, 
and a management program. The management shall designate responsibil-
ity for achieving targets, and determine the means and time frames for both 
new and existing activities.49 Management is to provide human and finan-
cial resources essential to implementation, appropriate training, periodic 
monitoring, and corrective or preventive action in cases of nonconfor-
mance.50 The organization must also periodically audit its EMS perfor-
mance, and top management must review the system's suitability and 
46 The EMS Draft Standard states "[t)here is an important distinction between this 
specification which describes the requirements for certification/registration and/or self-declara-
tion of an organization's environmental management system and a non-certifiable guideline 
intended to provide generic assistance to an organization for implementing or improving an 
environmental management system." INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
DRAFT INTERNATIONAL STANDARD FOR CERTIFICATION, ISO/TC 207/DIS 14001, Introduction 
(July 1995) [hereinafter DRAFT INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 14001). Later drafts include only edi-
torial changes. 
47 The two Draft International Standards have been approved in six months of balloting by 
member bodies, and then reissued for a 2-month joint ISO/CEN ballot. If at least two-thirds 
of all ISO members agree, and not more than a quarter vote against them, the standards will 
become final. The ISO standard will also be voted on as an American National Standard and, 
if approved, will simultaneously become the US and global standard. Id. 
48 Id.4.2.1. 49 /d. 4.2.3, 4.2.4. 50 /d. 4.3, 4.4. 
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I22 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
effectiveness.51 Each of these steps is specified and elaborated on in the 
specification document and, in greater detail, in the guidance document. 
From the start, the debates over drafting the standard have revolved 
around the extent to which it would contain substantive, performance-based 
obligations or would be only a set of prescribed procedures and manage-
ment techniques. A purely procedural approach allows maximum flexibility 
for management, but does not necessarily guarantee optimal environmental 
outcomes. 52 It has the advantage of forcing organizations to engage in inter-
nal discussion before establishing goals and priorities, making it perhaps 
more likely that organizations will take the resulting plans seriously rather 
than seeking minimal or half-hearted compliance with externally-imposed 
rules. The danger is that because the goals and priorities are entirely self-
chosen, they will only be implemented until changes no longer result in 
short-term cost avoidance or savings. Organizations will avoid investments 
requiring a longer investment horizon or that impose costs. Indeed, because 
compliance with local law is the only prescribed floor or minimum standard, 
companies that set and meet extremely lenient goals will conform to the 
standard to the same or greater extent than those companies that set more 
ambitious, and harder to realize, objectives. 
As it now stands, the draft international EMS standard "does not estab-
lish absolute requirements for environmental performance beyond commit-
ment, in the policy, to compliance with applicable legislation and regulation 
and to continual improvement."53 An annex elaborates: "the rate and extent 
of [continual improvement] will be determined by the organization in the 
light of economic and other circumstances .... The establishment and oper-
ation of an EMS will not, in itself, necessarily result in an immediate reduc-
tion of adverse environmental impact."54 
Disputes over procedure versus substance cropped up in several places. 
One of the most contentious involved the definition of "continual improve-
ment" and whether evaluating the EMS would involve evaluating only 
improvements in the system itself, or also in its actual results. EMAS 
requires evaluation of a specified group of parameters, including resource 
use, waste avoidance, and the like. It then requires continual improvement 
of a participating site's actual performance in these areas. The United States 
and some other participants pushed for a definition of "continual improve-
ment" that did not impose minimum rates of emissions or toxics reduction. 
European delegates, led by Austria, Denmark, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, wanted language directly linking continual improvement with 
improvement in performance, not just of the system's operation. 
The current draft specifies that continual improvement merely refers to 
"the process for enhancing the EMS to achieve improvements in overall 
51 ld. 4.4.4, 4.5. 52 ld. at Introduction. 53 ld. 
54 ld. at Annex A (Informative), A.4.0. 
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ARTICLES 123 
environmental performance, in line with the organization's environmental 
policy. Note: The process need not take place in all areas simultaneously."55 
The tie-in between continual improvement and the organization's policy 
obtained the European delegates' agreement. But the definition of "envi-
ronmental performance" is only the "measurable results of the EMS relat-
ing to an organization's control of the environmental aspects of its 
activities." An earlier draft made the difference clear: it defined performance 
as the "measurable outputs of the EMS, relating to an organization's con-
trol of the impacts of its activities ... on the environment."56 
Along similar lines, the United States and some other non-European del-
egations wished to limit evaluation of performance to conformance of the 
management system itself-did it operate as intended, were feedback loops 
operational, and the like-rather than of actual environmental perfor-
mance. They argued that an international standard could not be dominated 
by the requirements of one region, and should focus on management sys-
tems, leaving performance to other regulatory tools and other parts of the 
standard-setting process. At the July 1995 meeting, compromise language 
was worked out that, according to at least some participants, clarifies that 
the draft EMS standard covers objectives and targets, and that continual 
improvement refers not only to refinements in the system itself, but to 
improvement of objectives and targets. 57 While an improvement over prior 
drafts, the standard still leaves no way to judge whether the improvements 
are sufficient, and permits a company starting from a very low baseline to 
"improve" without ever meeting any international benchmark for adequate 
performance beyond compliance with local law. 
Another aspect of this debate concerned the extent to which the standard 
would require a specific level of pollution control technology. At one point 
some European representatives pressed for a standard of "viable and 
55 !d. 3.l. 
56 BENCHMARK ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING/EEB, ISO 14001: AN UNCOMMON PERSPECTIVE: 
FIVE PUBLIC POLICY QUESTIONS FOR PROPONENTS OF THE ISO 14000 SERIES 15 (1995). 
57 Interview with Dick Hortensius. Chief Negotiator of the Dutch Delegation, and Jose Cascio, 
Head of the US Delegation to TC 207,18 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 555, 556 (1995). The changed 
wording comes in the definition section of the specification standard. The previous definition 
of "environmental management system" was "[t]he organizational structure, responsibilities, 
practices, procedures, processes and resources for implementing and maintaining environmen-
tal management." ISO/TC207/SCIIN 47, §3.6. In the July 1995 draft, the new definition read: 
"[t]hat part of the overall management system which includes organization, structural chang-
ing activities, responsibilities, practices, procedure, process and services for developing, imple-
menting, achieving, reviewing and monitoring the environmental policy." The key change is 
the reference to policy at the end. The environmental policy section includes commitments to 
compliance, continual improvement, pollution prevention, and setting and reviewing environ-
mental objectives and targets. Thus, at least according to some delegates, the policy becomes 
an auditable part of the EMS. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS UPDATE, July 1995, at 
SB-27. However, this may be minimally useful, as attempts to extend audit requirements to 
objectives and targets failed. !d. at SB-33. 
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achievable best available technology."58 While such a standard might have 
little practical effect in much of Europe, where it would add little to exist-
ing laws,59 the US participants worried that in the United States it would 
change substantive legal requirements and could result in enormous civil 
and/or criminal liability. As a result, the standard's introduction merely pro-
vides that "the EMS should encourage organizations to consider imple-
mentation of best available technology where appropriate and where 
economically viable. In addition, the cost effectiveness of such technology 
should be fully taken into account."60 It also specifies, in a late addition, 
that the standards "are not intended to be used to ... increase or change 
an organization's legal obligations."61 
The draft standard's definition of "environmental policy" does have some 
substantive components, but even these are limited. One requirement is "a 
commitment to comply with relevant environmental legislation and regula-
tions, and with other requirements to which the organization subscribes."62 
But organizations seeking certification presumably are already under a legal 
obligation to comply with local law; there is no additional requirement that, 
for example, an organization with operations in several countries apply the 
same rules, or the most stringent rules, to all its operations worldwide. 63 
The ISO definition of "organization" allows each operating unit of a cor-
poration to be considered as a separate organization. This may be useful in 
ensuring that each operating unit must independently qualify for 
certification, but it also means there is no way to hold transnational firms 
operating in several countries to a higher standard than local law allows in 
each one. In contrast, several existing business codes of conduct call for 
global corporations to conform to home country standards wherever they 
58 Interview with Christopher Bell, Sidley & Austin, Member of the Technical Committee, 
in Washington, DC (Apr. 7, 1994). EMAS requires participating companies to aim at reduc-
ing environmental impacts to levels not exceeding those corresponding to economically viable 
application of best available technology. EMAS, supra note 23, Art. 3(a). 
59 For example, German law has far-reaching duties requiring the imposition of the "state 
of technology" to control emissions. See Turner T. Smith Jr. & Renne R. Falzone, Foreign 
Environmental Legal Systems: A Brief Review, 11 INT'L ENY'T REP. 621 (1988); see also Elli 
Louka, Bringing Polluters Before Transnational Courts: Why Industry Should Demand Strict 
and Unlimited Liability for the Transnational Movements of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes, 
22 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 63 (1993). In the United States, in contrast, most existing sources 
have to comply with less stringent technological requirements, at least for non-toxic pollutants. 
WILLIAM RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 54-55, 228-29 (2d ed. 1994). 
60 DRAFT INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 14001, supra note 46, at Introduction. The Introduction 
is not part of the specification part of the standard, but merely provides guidance. 
61 Id at p. 1. This language is missing from the May 1994 draft. 
62 The guidance annex specifies that "other requirements" may include industry codes of 
practice, agreements with public authorities, or non-regulatory guidelines. Id. at Annex, 
A4.2.2. 
63 See, e.g., Alan Neff, Not in Their Backyards, Either? A Proposal for a Foreign 
Environmental Practices Act, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 477 (1990). see also BENCHMARK 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING, supra note 56, at 23-24. 
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operate.64 Thus, as a tool for certifying environmental responsibility, the 
current draft international standard adds little. 
The other substantive requirement worth noting is that the organization's 
environmental policy must include efforts at "pollution prevention." This 
language, inserted by the US delegation, is good in that it goes beyond com-
pliance with existing laws and is in line with the thrust of much current 
thinking on environmental protection. But objections from some ISO dele-
gations watered down the definition perhaps beyond the point of usefulness. 
At the July 1995 Oslo meeting, the definition was changed to include 
processes to control pollution, which may include recycling and treatment. 65 
According to the US EPA and many other experts,66 simple pollution con-
trol, after-the-fact treatment, and off-site recycling are not really prevention. 
Prevention focuses on changes in process, practices, and materials to avoid 
introducing pollutants into the environment at all. 
A third area of debate concerned the specificity and public nature of 
requirements for evaluating environmental impacts. The original British 
standard that served as a model for the ISO draft contained a requirement 
for an "environmental effects register." Under the BSI 7750 standard, orga-
nizations must establish and maintain a register of significant direct and 
indirect environmental effects of activities, products, and services.67 While 
the purpose of an environmental effects register is to identify areas for 
improvement, US participants worried that in the US legal and regulatory 
climate, a document listing detrimental environmental impacts of corporate 
activity could be requisitioned by regulators or discovered in litigation, with 
disastrous consequences.68 The draft ISO standard thus contains no men-
tion of an environmental register, only references to a "procedure to iden-
tify the environmental aspects of its activities, products and services that it 
can control and over which it can be expected to have an influence, in order 
64 See. e.g., Business Charter on Sustainable Development, supra note 15; The Canadian 
Chemical Producers Association's Responsible Care guidelines also apply to worldwide oper-
ations. BENCHMARK ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING, supra note 56, at 24. 
65 It now reads: "Prevention of Pollution: Use of processes, practices, materials, or products 
that avoid, reduce or control pollution which may include recycling, treatment, process 
changes, control mechanisms, efficient use of resources, and materials substitutions." DRAFT 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 14001, supra note 46, at 3.14. 
66 See US EPA, POLICIES FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION (1991); RETHINKING THE MATERIALS WE 
USE: A NEW Focus FOR POLLUTION POLICY, supra note 3. 
67 The register was to include, as appropriate, air and water emissions; wastes; land conta-
mination; use of land, water, fuels, and energy and other natural resources; noise; visual 
impact; effects on specific ecosystems arising from both normal operations and accidents; and 
such information regarding future planned activities. BSI BS 7750, §4.4.3 and Annex A.4. As 
noted, EMAS requires similarly detailed evaluations. 
68 Interview with Christopher Bell, supra note 58. Similar concerns were raised about requir-
ing an audit verifying compliance with local laws. Committee Draft on Management Standards 
Addresses Pollution Avoidance Compliance, 18 INT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA), Mar. 8, 1995, at 175. 
Joe Cascio, head of US technical committee, says some US industry representatives were con-
cerned that compliance audits might become public and be used for enforcement purposes. 
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I26 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
to determine those which have or can have significant impacts on the envi-
ronment."69 The organization need only "consider" the aspects related to 
these significant impacts in setting objectives and targets. An annex specifies 
air emissions, releases to water, waste management, and the like as possible 
environmental aspects, but contains nothing mandatory, leaving it up to 
each organization to consider such parameters "where appropriate."7o 
Furthermore, the procedure, and its results, need not be made public. The 
United States argued that requiring environmental policies and objectives 
to be publicly available would discourage companies from setting ambi-
tious, meaningful objectives rather than listing vague platitudes.71 European 
representatives, on the other hand, argued that credibility depended on 
making at least basic information publicly available. In addition, EMAS 
requires public disclosure, and the external pressure presumably generated 
by such disclosure is considered central to its effectiveness.72 The draft stan-
dard does require the organization's environmental policies to be publicly 
available. But on the more important issue of environmental impacts, it 
requires only that "the organization shall consider processes for external 
communication on significant environmental aspects of its activities and 
record its decision."73 
69 DRAFT INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 14001, supra note 46, at 4.2.1. 
70 Id. at Annex, A4.2.1.2. Those parameters are to be systematized and harmonized through 
the work of the Environmental Performance Evaluation (EPE) subcommittee of TC 207, 
expected to be ready by 1998. EPE is a "process to measure, analyze, assess, and describe an 
organization's environmental performance against agreed criteria for appropriate management 
purposes." It defines a system for measuring and reporting performance improvements such as 
units of measurement and base time periods. 
Originally, the subcommittee divided into working groups on generic and sector-specific 
EPE. The Europeans, especially the Norwegians, pushed for a standard that would specify, for 
some 5-10 priority industry sectors, maximum allowable emissions of key pollutants. 
Christopher Bell & James Connaughton, New Global Standards May Guide Industry on 
Environmental Issues, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 6, 1993, at S4. Others, including the United States, con-
sidered the effort as too ambitious and too fraught with difficulties stemming from regional 
and local variation. They wanted more general criteria, to be used primarily as internal eval-
uation tools. The United States position prevailed: as of April, 1994, development of indus-
trial sector indicators was abandoned, and the EPE group reconfigured into working groups 
on management system EPE and operational system EPE. The operational system EPE is to 
develop a series of diagnostic tools for measuring environmental performance. These will 
include such measures as quantity per unit of production of effluents, emissions, and wastes; 
changes in output over time; and compliance record. Companies will be free to pick and choose 
among the indicators, however, none will be required. 
71 See Bell & Connaughton, supra note 70. 
72 Caroline London & Brizay London, Disclosure Obligations and Due Diligence Practices 
in Europe, C764 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 667, 670-71, Sept. 24, 1992, (discussing EC Directive of June 
7, 1990, requiring freedom of access to information on the environment); European 
Community: Business Warned of More Disclosure, Environmental Audits in Europe, DAILY INT'L 
ENVTL. REP. (BNA), April 22, 1992. Also, Article 5 of EMAS requires a published environ-
mental statement, including a summary of data on emissions, wastes, consumption of raw 
materials and energy, and other factors. EMAS, supra note 23. 
73 DRAFT INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO 14001, supra note 46, at 4.3.3. Communication with 
stakeholders is also limited: when establishing its objectives, an organization is to consider the 
 at H
astings College of the Law
 on June 16, 2016
http://yielaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
ARTICLES I27 
The reach of the ISO standards is more limited than that of EMAS. 
EMAS requires firms to "ensure that suppliers and those acting on the orga-
nization's behalf comply with the company's environmental policy as it 
relates to them."74 The draft ISO 14000 standard is more vague as to the 
registered companies obligations, requiring only "communication of rele-
vant procedures and requirements to suppliers and contractors."75 The idea 
that ISO-certified companies might require outside parties to meet any sim-
ilar requirements was specifically rejected.76 
A final area of controversy concerned the relationship between the EMS 
and environmental audits.77 EMAS requires a public statement, contains 
detailed requirements for audits, and requires the use of an external 
verifier. 78 The audit required under EMAS covers not only the management 
system, but also the data on environmental performance. Here again, 
European participants maintained that a system of audits that included 
independent audit verification and publication of at least a summary of 
audit results was necessary for both credibility and real pressure for 
improvement. Other delegations, led by the United States, found the costs 
of third-party verification excessive and often unnecessary,79 especially after 
the US experience with quality control, where verifiers had to be hired from 
Europe.8o In the end, the US position prevailed. The Draft International 
Standard for Certification requires only an internal audit of the manage-
ment system itself, to determine whether it conforms to the standard and 
views of interested parties, but it is unclear on the basis of what information such parties are 
to form their views, or to what extent companies must act on the views expressed. Id. at 4.2.3. 
74 EMAS, supra note 23, at Annex I, 4(b). 
75 DRAFT INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 14001, supra note 46, at 4.3.6.(c) is entitled "control 
procedures for routine operations." It requires the organization to "establish and maintain pro-
cedures related to the significant environmental aspects of goods and services used by the orga-
nization and communication of relevant procedures and requirements to suppliers and 
contractors." Elsewhere, the Annex warns that "[t]he control and influence over the environ-
mental aspects of products vary significantly, depending on the market situation of the orga-
nization." !d. at Annex A4.2.1. 
76 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS UPDATE, supra note 57, at SB-32. 
77 A separate subcommittee within TC 207 is developing specific auditing standards. 
Detailed procedural requirements for audits are laid out in separate draft standards dealing 
with general audit principles (ISO 14010), auditing of environmental management systems (ISO 
14011/1) and qualification criteria for environmental auditors (ISO 14012), all of which were 
approved as draft international standards in July 1995. They deal with such issues as period-
icity of audits, confidentiality of audit results, appropriate training for auditors, and the like. 
Other auditing standards on compliance/performance audits and auditing of environmental 
status were deleted, while a new proposal for environmental site assessments was to be decided 
on in 1997. Draft International 14000 Series Standards-Document Status, QUALITY SYSTEMS 
UPDATE, SPECIAL REPORT, July 1995, at R-4. 
78 EMAS, supra note 23, Art. 4.3, Annex 2. 
79 By one estimate, third-party certification had added 20% to the cost of registration with 
the ISO 9000 standard. Joe Cascio, International Environmental Management Standards, 
ASTM STANDARDIZATION NEWS, April 1994, at 45. 
80 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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128 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
has been properly implemented and maintained.81 It also requires a man-
agement review to ensure the "continuing suitability, adequacy and effec-
tiveness" of the EMS.82 The audit is designed to serve a strictly internal 
function. The organization may decide whether the audit is to be internal 
or external, and there is no obligation to make the audit results public. 
In all these instances, the main lines of debate pitted European partici-
pants against a "rest-of-the-world" camp led by the United States. Domestic 
considerations largely drove both sides. The US position was generally to 
seek less substantive, more procedural and flexible positions that preserved 
management prerogatives and corporate secrecy.83 European representa-
tives wished to ensure that compliance with the ISO standard would also 
constitute compliance with the EMAS regulation,84 which imposed several 
more substantive obligations, as did existing national European standards. 
Countries worried about the possible trade-restrictive or competitiveness 
effects of substantive standards tended to support the US delegation. This 
included many developing-country delegations. 
In addition to the European imperative to make the standard acceptable 
to the European Commission for EMAS purposes, many of the differences 
originated in divergent legal cultures and norms between Europe and the 
United States. In Europe, discovery rules are more protective,85 and the 
threat of large-scale liability or criminal prosecutions is more remote.86 
There is no Europe-wide enforcement agency equivalent to the US EPA, 
and national enforcement of environmental law varies greatly among 
European statesP Regulatory compliance and liability concerns drive the 
move toward environmental management and auditing standards in the 
United States, while proving that a company is "green" is a more salient 
motivator in Europe.88 Moreover, many companies in the United States 
have been in the forefront of recent efforts to shield the results of voluntary 
81 DRAFT INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 14001, supra note 46, at 4.4.4. 
82 Id. at 4.5. 
83 Some of these debates are described above. On the other hand, the US delegation was 
responsible for inserting language requiring efforts at "pollution prevention" by all organiza-
tions seeking certification. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
84 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STANDARDS, ISO/TC 207, UPDATE (May 
1994) (on file with author). See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text. 
8S See, e.g., Louka, supra note 59; see also Peter Roorda, The Internationalization of the 
Practice of Law, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141 (1993). 
86 See, e.g., Barbara A. Boczar, Toward a Viable Environmental Regulatory Framework: 
From Corporate Environmental Management to Regulatory Consensus, 6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 291 
(1994); Gert Bruggermeir, Enterprise Liability for "Environmental Damage" in German Law and 
EC Law, 2 NEW EUR. L. REV. 17 (1994). 
87 See James E. Pfander, Environmental Federalism in Europe and the United States: A 
Comparative Assessment of Regulation Through the Agency of Member States, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY WITH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 59, 72 (John B. Braden et 
al. eds., 1995). 
88 See Linda Spedding, Environmental Auditing and International Standards, 3 REV. EUR. 
COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 14, 15 (1994). 
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environmental audits from public and regulatory scrutiny, and were not 
about to let international standards undermine their domestic positions.89 
Finally, as discussed below, the especially corporate-heavy nature of the US 
delegation to ISO may explain some of the positions taken. 
III. PRODUCT STANDARDS AND ECO-LABELLING 
The EMAS and ISO 14000 approaches focus on organizations and their 
production processes, seeking to gather information on the impacts gener-
ated during the production and distribution cycle of any number of prod-
ucts. In contrast, the eco-labelling approach begins with the product itself, 
looking at the environmental impacts of a particular product from "cradle 
to grave"-production, distribution, use, and disposal. It attempts to create 
economic incentives for products with less environmental impact by pro-
viding information to consumers. 
A. Eco-Labelling and Life-Cycle Assessment Standards 
Eco-labelling programs now exist in at least 11 countries as well as the EU 
and the Nordic Council. 90 Examples are Green Seal and Green Choice in 
the United States and Blue Angel in Germany. In March 1992, the EC 
Council passed a regulation setting up a Community eco-label for environ-
89 Industry representatives are now attempting to have information generated in the process 
of conducting a very broadly defined "environmental audit" declared confidential. Under 
heavy corporate pressure, seven states have enacted legislation creating a broad "self-evalua-
tive" privilege for anything termed an audit report, while 21 others have legislation pending. 
More States Adopt Audit Privilege Laws; EPA Calls Federal Legislation Ill-Advised, 25 ENV'T 
REP. (BNA) 2186 (1995). A proposed federal Environmental Audit Protection Act would allow 
any document labeled an "environmental audit report" or its supporting documentation to be 
kept confidential. The theory is that if regulators or the public could obtain information con-
tained in an audit that was not required under the law, the thoroughness of the audit would 
suffer. Opponents respond that unscrupulous corporations will be able to cover almost any-
thing, including evidence of legal violations, under the rubric of an "environmental audit 
report," and will use the audit process strategically to disclose some violations but not others. 
Under EPA's current audit policy, EPA will not routinely request access to a firm's audits in 
the course of enforcement activities, but reserves the right to demand access to audits on a 
case-by-case basis. US EPA, RESTATEMENT OF POLICIES RELATED TO ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING 
4 (1994), reprinted in 59 Fed. Reg. 38455 (July 28, 1994). The current ISO draft environmen-
tal audit standards neither require nor forbid publication of audit results by the client, 
although they do require the auditee's permission where the client and auditee are different. 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
AUDITING, AUDITING OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, ISO/TC207/SC2/N64 at 5.4.3 
(1995). For a fuller discussion, see Sanford Lewis, Corporate Environmental Audits and the 
Public's Right to Know (Feb. 1, 1995) (unpublished report, on file with author); David Ronald, 
The Case Against an Environmental Audit Privilege, 29 CHEMICAL WASTE LITIG. REP. 167, 
168-69 (1995); No Audit Privilege in Interim EPA Policy; Lack of Prosecution, Punitive Fines 
Possible, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2411 (1995). 
90 Programs exist in Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States. 
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I30 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
mentally superior goods.91 The EC has developed criteria for labelling 
certain consumer durables like washing machines and dishwashers,92 as well as 
for toilet paper, paper kitchen towels, soil improvers, and laundry detergents.93 
Most eco-labelling programs are sponsored by government agencies,94 
although in the United States only non-governmental programs exist. The 
most prevalent are programs that give seals of approval to products that 
meet a set of criteria regarding the product's overall environmental impact. 
The groups awarding these labels recognize the subjective nature of the 
weights assigned to different measures of environmental superiority; there-
fore they rely on advisory boards or other groups to make the judgments 
involved.95 Certifiers typically grant seal-of-approvallabels to only the top 
10-15% of products in a given field, hoping that the seal or label will pro-
vide such industry leaders with a marketing edge that the rest of the indus-
try will want to emulate.96 Manufacturers pay to have their products 
91 Council Regulation No. 880/92 of March 23, 1992, on a Community eco-Iabel award 
scheme, published in 1992 OJ L 99 (Aprilll, 1992). The scheme is intended to promote the design, 
production, marketing, and use of products that have a reduced environmental impact during 
their entire life cycle. Specific ecological criteria for each product group (defined as products that 
serve similar purposes and that have equivalent uses) are to be defined by the Commission in con-
sultation with Community-level representatives of industry, commerce, consumer, and environ-
mental organizations. Manufacturers or importers will then apply to "competent bodies" to be 
designated within each member state, who will decide if the eco-Iabel will be awarded. The gen-
erallist of criteria annexed to the regulation is based on product life-cycle analysis. 
92 93/430/EEC: Commission Decision of 28 June 1993 establishing the ecological criteria for 
the award of the Community eco-Iabe1 to washing machines; 93/431/EEC: Commission 
Decision of 28 June 1993 establishing the ecological criteria for the award of the Community 
eco-Iabel to dishwashers, both published at 1993 OJ L 198 (Aug. 7, 1993). The eco-Iabel is to 
be awarded on the basis of meeting minimum performance standards for energy use, water use, 
and recyclability of certain plastic parts. 
93 Eco-labelling work starts on seven new product groups, ENDS REP. 247, Aug. 1995, at 28. 
The criteria for soil improvers and paper products have been highly controversial, and pro-
posed criteria for paints and varnishes have yet to be approved by the Commission. To date, 
only one manufacturer, Hoover, has received an EC eco-Iabel for its products. !d. 
94 For example, the German Blue Angel program has since 1978 operated as a joint effort 
of the German Federal Ministry of the Environment, the German Institute for Quality Control 
and Labelling, and a representative non-governmental Environmental Labelling Jury. GARY A. 
DAVIS, THE USE OF LIFE-CYCLE ASSESSMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING PROGRAMS 17 (1993) 
(prepared for Pollution Prevention Division, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, US 
EPA). The French program is run by the national standards organization, while the Dutch 
eco-Iabel, although administered by a non-governmental foundation, is financed by the gov-
ernment. [d. at 20,21. The Singapore Green Labelling Scheme is administered by the Ministry 
of the Environment, while the Japanese Eco-Mark Program operates under the guidance of the 
National Environment Agency. !d. at 34, 36. 
95 For a description of the US Green Seal, see Roger D. Wynne, The Emperor's New Eco-
Logos?: A Critical Review of the Scientific Certification Systems Environmental Report Card and 
the Green Seal Certification Mark Programs, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 83-93 (1994). 
96 Interview with Arthur Weissman, Green Seal, in Washington, DC (April 6, 1994); see also 
Norman L. Dean, Testimony ... Before the Federal Trade Commission on Issues Relating to 
Environmental Marketing and Advertising Claims and Pending Petitions for Interpretive 
Guides 5 (July 17, 1991); Norman L. Dean, Life-Cycle Review as a Tool in Standard-Setting, 
in RETHINKING THE MATERIALS WE USE: A NEW Focus FOR POLLUTION POLICY 47,50, supra note 
3; Wynne, supra note 95, at 88. 
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ARTICLES 13 1 
evaluated for compliance with the specifications, and, if they pass, receive 
the right to display an eco-Iabel and use it in advertising.97 
To date, the different programs share no common criteria or methodo-
logy. A recent US EPA study showed that although the different national 
programs address the same general environmental issues and the same prod-
uct categories, they use very different methodologies and parameters to 
establish an acceptable level of environmental benefit.98 Even when pro-
ducers refer to only one attribute of a product-its recyclability, for exam-
ple-the word means different things in different places and according to 
different manufacturers. 
One way to decide whether a product has superior environmental attrib-
utes is to perform some version of a life-cycle analysis (LeA). LeA tries to 
evaluate and quantify the environmental impacts of a product from incep-
tion to disposa1.99 According to the US EPA, it consists of three steps: 
inventory analysis, impact analysis, and improvement analysis. lOo There is 
some emerging consensus as to the first step, which is to identify and quan-
tify resource use and environmental releases in common units, using a com-
mon data-gathering methodology. 101 A common approach to using such an 
inventory to evaluate overall environmental effects is still in its infancy. 
There is no generally accepted methodology. Especially problematic is the 
valuation of different types of impacts in relation to each other, which 
depends in large part on social and cultural values and preferences. 102 So 
too is the determination of boundaries-whether, for instance, LeA should 
also consider the manufacture of component parts or energy generation in 
evaluating impacts. 103 In addition, LeA analysis is very expensive and time 
97 Kristin Dawkins, Ecolabelling: Consumers' Right to Know or Restrictive Business 
Practice?, INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY, Sept. 1995, at 3. 
98 DAVIS, supra note 94, at 38--40. 
99 US EPA RISK REDUCTION ENGINEERING LABORATORY, LIFE-CYCLE ASSESSMENT: 
INVENTORY GUIDELINES AND PRINCIPLES 98-99, EPAl600/R-921245 (1993). 
100 Some practitioners add a fourth step, the scoping and goal definition, or initiation step. 
For a fuller description, see SOCIETY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY, A 
TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIFE-CYCLE ASSESSMENTS (1991); US EPA RISK REDUCTION 
ENGINEERING LABORATORY, supra note 99. 
101 US EPA RISK REDUCTION ENGINEERING LABORATORY, supra note 99. 
102 DAVIS, THE USE OF LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING PROGRAMS, 
supra note 94, at 4-6. LCA has to date proven quite sensitive to small changes in assumptions 
and categories of analysis. For example, LCA studies on the relative impacts of different bot-
tling methods, or of cloth versus paper diapers, have come to differing conclusions. See, e.g., 
PETER S. MENELL, Eco-INFORMATION POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE, John 
M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 104 34-36 (1993). Menell 
describes how two studies (commissioned respectively by the diaper services industry and the 
disposable diaper makers) came to dramatically different numbers in estimating such variables 
as the water consumption of cloth diaper services. While both considered a similar range of 
impacts, they reached different conclusions on many of them. 
103 See US EPA RISK REDUCTION ENGINEERING LABORATORY, supra note 99. In addition, 
effects such as habitat modification, thermal pollution, and noise pollution are not easily 
amenable to quantification for inventory purposes. For more on the limits of LCA, see Mary 
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132 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
consuming. For these reasons, most eco-Iabelling programs use only a lim-
ited form of LCA, focusing on one or two product attributes and limited 
boundaries. 104 
The difficulties with LCA and eco-1abelling become more salient on the 
international level because of differing environmental contexts and degrees 
of development. The first key issue is deciding which categories of impacts 
to inventory. For example, in sparsely populated, arid areas, water use and 
conservation may be an important characteristic, whereas in a relatively 
wet, densely populated area it might be unimportant. 
Determining which of the inventoried impacts to stress is also problem-
atic. For example, a standard that favors recycled paper over farmed pulp 
may be appropriate in a densely populated, technologically advanced soci-
ety, but not in an agricultural country with abundant land and less ability 
to manage the toxic wastes that result from the recycling process. l05 
Another question might be whether global and local impacts should receive 
the same weight or whether global impacts like ozone loss or climate change 
should be stressed. Other issues include categorization of emissions and 
choice of units (e.g., absolute or relative to a threshold of potential harm). 
Finally, LCA is at present very expensive, and probably beyond the reach 
of small and medium producers. Any requirement to implement a full LCA, 
at this point, favors larger producers. 
The proliferation of groups and of unsubstantiated claims of environ-
mental friendliness has led to increasing calls for order among both pro-
ducers and consumers. 106 The labelling programs themselves have 
responded by creating a forum for harmonization of criteria. 107 In addition, 
ISO's TC 207 has created subcommittees on both eco-Iabelling and LCA.IOS 
The ISO Sub-Committee on Environmental Labelling has, as of this writ-
ing, focused on producing three guidelines: a general document on Goals 
Ann Curran, Broad-Based Environmental Life-Cycle Assessment, 27 ENVfL. SCI. & TECH. 430, 
433-35 (1993). 
104 DAVIS, THE USE OF LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING PROGRAMS, 
supra note 94. 
105 In the European eco-labelling context, Brazil objected to the criteria for paper products 
on these grounds, among others. Dawkins, supra note 97, at 55. 
106 See George Richards, Environmental Labelling of Consumer Products: The Need for 
International Harmonization of Standards Governing Third-Party Certification Programs, 7 GEO. 
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 235 (1994). 
107 Interview with Valerie Douglas, Green Seal Vice-President of International Standards, 
in Washington, DC (April 6, 1994). 
108 The LCA subcommittee is still in the early stages of developing drafts on principles and 
guidelines and on inventory analysis, impact assessment and improvement assessment (now 
termed "interpretation.") Progress has been hampered by the uncertain state of the underlying 
science, and overall rules are several years away. Other issues raised by the LCA subcommit-
tee include differences between "in-house" LCA analysis and that done for purposes of com-
paring one's product to that of others, known as "comparative assertions." The draft proposal 
includes additional requirements to use the results of LeA for comparative purposes. 
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and Principles of All Environmental Labelling109 and more specific guide-
lines for multiple-criteria "practitioner" programs110 and self-declaration 
environmental claims. 11 I 
One early debate over the labelling standard concerned its ultimate goal. 
While professional labelling practitioners from groups like Green Seal and 
Blue Angel stressed environmental improvement through market mecha-
nisms as the goal, most corporate participants have favored an emphasis on 
simply providing consumers with accurate information. llz An early draft of 
the Goals and Principles document clearly spelled out the goal of labelling 
as improving the environmental performance of products and services, but 
by August 1995, the section on goals had become a general introduction 
that was not even technically part of the standard. It affirmed that: 
the overall goal of the ISO 14000 series is to lessen the stress placed on the envi-
ronment by the production, use and disposal of products and services .... The use 
of environmental labels/declarations, based on accurate, non-deceptive and 
verifiable information, contributes to this overall goal by stimulating the potential 
for market-driven continuous environmental improvement. 
The November 1995 meeting rejected this language too, and a revised goal 
statement referencing environmental improvement is now part of the draft 
standard again. But the debate over goals continues. 
The draft principles require environmentallabe1s/declarations to be accu-
rate, verifiable, relevant, non-deceptive, and based on scientific methodo-
logy. Further, they must not inhibit innovation. While they should, 
109 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION ORGANIZATION, GOALS AND PRINCIPLES OF ALL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING, Committee Draft ISO 14020 (July 1995). 
110 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION ORGANIZATION, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING-
PRACTITIONER PROGRAMS-GUIDING PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES AND CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES OF 
MULTIPLE (TYPE I) PROGRAMS, Committee Draft 14024, (July 1995). In the ISO terminology, 
Type I labels are "multiple criteria-based third party" or "seal-of-approval" labels given to 
products that meet a set of criteria regarding the product's overall environmental impact. The 
subcoinmittee's draft standard for Type I programs failed to win sufficient support in July 1995 
to be advanced to draft international standard status, and a new vote was expected by early 
1996. 
Type II labels are "self-declaration claims," discussed below. A Type III label does not try 
to evaluate overall impact, but simply reports the findings of an independently conducted life-
cycle assessment under a set of pre-established indices. While standards for Type III labels were 
part of the 1993 work plan, work never began because too few of these programs existed world-
wide. A new work item on Type III labelling will probably come forward in 1996. QUALITY 
SYSTEMS UPDATE, supra note 77, at SR-4. 
111 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION ORGANIZATION, SELF DECLARATION ENVIRONMENTAL 
CLAIMS-TERMS AND DEFINITIONS, Committee Draft ISO 14021 (1996). These are single-
attribute claims made by manufacturers, without independent third-party certification, for such 
qualities as recycled content and compostability. They may take the form of statements, sym-
bols, or graphics on product or package labels, advertising, etc. 
112 TC207/SC3IWG3 correspondence, May-June 1994 (on file with author); interview with 
participants, Dec. 1995. 
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134 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
"wherever appropriate, take ... [] into consideration the life cycle of the 
product or service," there is no obligation to base labelling decisions on 
LeA. The principles require information to be provided to purchasers on 
the meaning of any claims, symbols, or other environmental attributes. Any 
concerned party is entitled to information about the procedures and 
methodology used to support the label. To protect against unfair advan-
tages for large producers, the principles require administrative requirements 
or information demands to be limited to those necessary to establish con-
formance, and not to entail unnecessary cost or administrative complexity. 
Another debate concerns the degree of consensus necessary to arrive at 
appropriate standards and criteria. While all participants agreed that all 
stakeholders should have input into the process, those involved in adminis-
tering seal-of-approval programs argued that requiring full consensus of all 
interested parties was impossible. Moreover, they argued, the criteria for 
granting labels would be undesireably watered down if producers unable to 
comply with stringent requirements could block a consensus decision. An 
early draft, therefore, required only that the decision-making process be 
"transparent to all potentially affected parties."113 By August 1995, how-
ever, corporate pressure had transformed that language into a requirement 
that standards and/or criteria "be developed through a consensus 
process." 114 
B. Eco-Labelling and International Trade Concerns 
The draft principle dealing with the potential use or misuse of eco-Iabels as 
barriers to trade has proven the most controversial. It involves two inter-
twined issues: the extent to which ISO institutionally had the ability to pro-
pose rules in an area where trade, development, and environment 
113 ISO TC 207/SC3/wG3/Draft 2, Apr. 14, 1994, principle 5. In the more specific guidance 
document on "multiple criteria-based practitioner programs," transparency requires only "the 
clear and 'open-for-examination' availability of the rationale and details on which the pro-
gramme is based, as well as availability for inspection and comment of other relevant infor-
mation. Guiding Principles, Practices and Criteria for Multiple Criteria-Based Practitioner 
Programmes Guide for Certification Procedures, Working Draft ISO/wD 14024.2, ISO/TC 
207/SC 3/WGlIN 43, Sept. 1995, at 4.8. Participation or consensus among stakeholders is not 
mentioned. 
114 ISO/TC 207/SC31N 64, Principle 9. The explanatory text specifies: 
[t]he process for developing standards and criteria shall be open to all interested parties. The parties shall 
be invited to participate and encouraged to become involved through timely and adequate notification. 
Parties may choose to participate directly or through other means such as written or electronic correspon-
dence. Comments and input shall be responded to in a meaningful way that addresses the substance of the 
comment or input. For further guidance see ISO guides 2 and 59. 
Those ISO guides define consensus to mean less than 100% agreement, but basic agreement 
among all major affected parties-leaving some room for a standard to be approved over the 
objections of one or more interests. Telephone Interview with Arthur Weissman, Green Seal 
(Dec. 11, 1995). 
 at H
astings College of the Law
 on June 16, 2016
http://yielaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
ARTICLES 135 
organizations are already actively working,1J5 and the content and 
specificity of any ISO 14000 principle on the subject. 
Eco-labelling has been particularly vulnerable to accusations that 
national programs in effect discriminate in favor of domestic producers. For 
example, eco-labelling criteria may reflect domestic perceptions of environ-
mental problems and their solutions, ignorance of "low-tech" alternatives 
to environmentally destructive practices,1J6 or high testing and certification 
costs for small producers, especially in poor countries.1J7 
GATT dispute resolution panels have on at least two occasions referred 
to voluntary labels as permissible, and indeed preferable, strategies for pro-
tection of health and the environment.1J8 Mandatory labelling schemes are 
more ambiguous. One the one hand, in the Thai Cigarette case a dispute 
settlement panel indicated that a "non-discriminatory regulation imple-
mented on a national treatment basis" requiring label disclosure of cigarette 
ingredients would be consistent with GATT.ll9 On the other, a 1991 
Austrian eco-labelling scheme was widely criticized as being inconsistent 
with GATT. Austria had enacted an ecolabelling law on tropical timber in 
an effort to use consumer pressure to improve timber-harvesting prac-
tices. 12o The law required labelling of all tropical timber and created a 
"quality mark" for timber from sustainable harvesting sources. It also 
increased import tariffs on tropical timber and used the resulting revenues 
to promote sustainable harvesting of tropical timber. 121 Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and other producers of tropical timber promptly protested the 
115 The World Trade Organization's Committee on Trade and Environment has taken up 
eco-Iabelling as part of its work programme. WTO SECRETARIAT, REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD 
16 FEB. 1995, WT/CTE/M/I, (Mar. 6, 1995). OECD, the United Nations Commission on Trade 
and Development, and the United Nations Environment Programme are all considering some 
aspect of eco-Iabelling or related issues. Dawkins, supra note 97, at II and nn.30-34. 
116 For example, the use of natural dyes rather than more environmentally friendly chemi-
cals in textiles, or the switching to use of jute or hemp instead of trying to make improvements 
in the creation of plastic-based products. 
117 See Dawkins, supra note 97, at 4-8; LAURA B. CAMPBELL, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT 
PROGRAMME, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: THEIR ROLE IN MUTUAL 
RECOGNITION OF ECOLABELLING SCHEMES (1994). 
118 In the Tuna-Dolphin I case, the panel upheld provisions of the US Dolphin Protection 
Consumer Information Act because the labelling law was voluntary and did not confer a gov-
ernment advantage. Paras. 5.41-5.42. GATT, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna 
(Sept. 3, 1991), Panel Report No. DS211R, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594. The case concerned 
provisions of the US Marine Mammal Protection Act that prohibited imports of tuna from 
countries that failed to take sufficient measures to ensure the safety of the dolphins that swim 
with schools of tuna. 
119 In that case, the panel recommended a label on cigarette packages as a less trade-restric-
tive, and therefore preferable, alternative to prohibitions on cigarette imports for health rea-
sons. GATT, Dispute Settlement Panel Report on Thai Restrictions on Importation of and 
Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (Nov. 7, 1990) 30 LL.M. 1122 (1991), at para. 77. 
120 Brian Chase, Tropical Forests and Trade Policy, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 349, 
375 (1994). 
121 !d. 
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136 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
measure under the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, arguing that it 
was a discriminatory non-tariff barrier. 122 Part ofthe problem under GATT 
was that the measure applied only to tropical timber, not all timber. 
Another problem was that there is no internationally agreed upon definition 
of "sustainably harvested timber."123 No dispute settlement panel was ever 
convened. In response to Malaysia and other Asian governments' threats to 
retaliate, Austria backed down. 
The European eco-Iabel has also created controversy, as qualifying goods 
must meet all EC health, safety, and environmental regulations during pro-
duction. 124 Many non-European companies have criticized this requirement 
as a trade barrier; indeed, one of the impetuses behind the ISO effort in this 
area is to create conditions for mutual recognition of programs with equiv-
alent, but not identical, criteria. 125 
An early version of the ISO eco-Iabelling standard simply noted that 
"environmental labelling should be non-discriminatory in its treatment of 
domestic and foreign products and services."126 As ISO participants learned 
more about the complexity of the trade and environment issue, that fairly 
uncontroversial statement expanded into a detailed, three-part statement of 
possible trade barriers, permissible restrictions, and ways to avoid potential 
conflicts. 127 As the language became more complex and debated, many par-
122 Austrian Industry. Malaysians Angered over Tropical Wood Labelling Requirement, INT'L 
ENV'T DAILY (BNA), Nov. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, BNAENV file. 
123 The Forest Stewardship Council, set up in October 1993, is an attempt to set global stan-
dards for good forest management and provide accreditation for organizations offering 
certification schemes for timber. See George Richards, Environmental Labelling of Consumer 
Products: The Need for International Harmonization of Standards Governing Third-Party 
Certification Programs, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 235, 245 (1994). 
124 Council Regulation No. 880/92, supra note 91, Art. 4.1. 
125 See generally Rene Vossenaar & Veena Jha, PPMs and Deve/oping Countries, in 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: 
PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS 137, 144-5 (1994). There is, however, considerable resis-
tance to including detailed references to mutual recognition or equivalence in the standard 
itself, because it is unclear exactly what would be entailed. JAMES CONNOUGHTON, SC 3, REPORT 
TO THE US TAG, TC 207, San Francisco, California (Apr. 18, 1996). 
126 TC 207/SC 3/WG 3/Draft 2/ Goals and Principles of All Environmental Labelling, Apr. 
14, 1994, at principle 8. The supporting text elaborated that: 
[t]he principle of "non-exclusivity" should be applied in general to avoid the exclusion of products or manu-
facturing processes otherwise recognized as legitimate ones. Criteria may de facto exclude certain foreign pro-
ducers because of their infringement of a basic environmental principle (for example, use of endangered species 
products), but the restriction should not be based on the fact that the producers are foreign .... "Regulatory 
equivalence" procedures should be provided in order to resolve an otherwise discriminatory situation. 
127 The August 1995 draft, ISO/TC 207/SC3/wG31N64, at principle 7 reads: 
instances of potentially unfair trade barriers include, but are not limited to, the following: 
• requirements to meet specific national or local legislation, regulations, or standards rather 
than performance objectives; 
• restrictions on testing methods such as the following: 
requiring national or local procedures rather than an internationally accepted testing or 
assessment method or an industry/trade test which has been subjected to peer review; 
. cont.! 
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ARTICLES 137 
ticipants began to fear that the ISO eco-labelling guidelines would be incon-
sistent with the work being carried out in other fora, especially the WTO's 
Committee on Trade and Environment. Although some developing coun-
tries were in favor of spelling out potential barriers to trade, as of December 
1995 the language was again reduced to a minimal prohibition on discrim-
ination against foreign producers, with a reference to the WTO for further 
information. 128 While this outcome seems correct in that ISO is an inap-
propriate forum for developing new rules in this highly contested area, it is 
unfortunate that the draft standard refers only to the WTO, ignoring other 
international organizations including the United Nations Environment 
Programme and the United Nations Committee on Trade and Develop-
ment, which are also working on the trade and environment issue. 
• restrictions on the recognition of testing facilities which could create an impossible geo-
graphic requirement; 
• language requirements related to the transmission of data and performance attributes; 
• inequitable application of costs, fees, charges, or requirements; 
• administrative requirements which limit access by foreign producers to activities or programs 
related to environmental labels/declarations or their ability to comment on the development 
of criteria for environmental labels/declarations; 
• requirements to conform with nationally developed technologies or manufacturing processes. 
There may be instances in which trade restrictions against certain products or services are legit-
imate. These include, but are not limited to, the following: 
• items covered by international conventions and treaties, such as ozone-depleting substances, 
endangered species, etc.; 
• products or services which current scientific data show to have a harmful effect on the envi-
ronment or public health of the country that is imposing the restrictions; 
In order to foster international harmonization in environmental labels/declarations and reduce 
any potential to unduly restrict trade, the following are recommended objectives: 
• recognition of environmental improvements in different countries as potentially equivalent 
based on their overall purpose and significance, even if the improvements are different in 
nature (e.g. aspect of environment affected); 
• mutual recognition among environmental labels/declarations based on equivalency of proce-
dure, criteria, and objectives. 
128 It now reads: "Procedures and requirements for environmental labels/declarations shall 
not be prepared, adopted, or applied with a view to, or with the effect of creating unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade. Note: For guidance on the above principle, the provisions and 
interpretations of the WTO should be taken into account." ISOITC 207IWG 3 meeting min-
utes, Seoul, Korea, Nov. 30, 1995 (on file with author). The language tracks exactly the for-
mulation in the Code of Good Practice, which is Annex 3 to the GATT's Technical Barriers 
to Trade Agreement, discussed in greater detail infra at note 191. Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, April 15, 1994, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1428 
(1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. The interpretative "note" regarding the WTO barely 
passed by a vote of 11 to 8, with two abstentions. 
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IV. PRIVATE VOLUNTARY STANDARDS AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
A. A Transnational Drafting Process 
Unlike prior ISO technical standards, or even quality assurance rules, the 
environmental management, life-cycle, eco-Iabelling, and related standards 
affect constituencies, both human and non-human, far beyond the certified 
and certifying organizations. Industry and other groups, including con-
sumers and environmentalists, must see these standards as legitimate if they 
are to be used. Although they have profound implications for public-policy 
choices on both a national and international level, this group of harmonized 
global standards, with the important exception of EMAS, ate not only 
voluntary but are being developed privately. The private nature of the stan-
dard-setting process raises several interesting issues for international envi-
ronmental law and policy, especially as compared to the better-known 
public international lawmaking process. 
First, instead of the usual multilateral or regional fora where states are 
the only decision-makers-admittedly counseled, assisted and lobbied by 
private groups- here the state is merely one actor among many (or, in the 
case of business codes of conduct, is completely absent). While state-run 
standardization organizations participate in ISO, they are not the dominant 
force; each national or liaison delegation gets a vote, and within each dele-
gation government officials have no special pride of place. 129 
The ISO standards' formation process supports a view of international 
law as composed not just of formal interactions among sovereign states, but 
as involving individuals, corporations, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), intergovernmental organizations like those related to the United 
Nations, and sub-national governments, as well as states. l3O In this view, the 
state is the major agent in rulemaking and creating international norms, but 
it is not the only player. Rather, it is the intersection of the public and pri-
vate, domestic and international spheres that creates the rules. 
129 Liaison organizations are generally intergovernmental or non-governmental organiza-
tions. They may be allowed to vote in work groups. 
130 Richard Falk, among others, has long been a proponent of this multilayered view of inter-
national society. See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989), especially 
Chs. I and 2. It is also reflected in liberal theories of international relations. See generally Ann-
Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 232 (1993). Burley and other scholars have identified three theoretical 
approaches to international relations: realism, institutionalism (or, more specifically, regime the-
ory) and liberal theory. Both realism and institutionalism assume states to be the sole and essen-
tially unitary actors on the international scene and do not attempt to unlock the "black box" 
of state sovereignty. They differ in their views as to the nature of conflict and cooperation 
among states. Liberal theorists, in contrast, begin with the interests of individuals and groups 
in both national and transnational society, which influence the preferences and interactions of 
states. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, the World Trade Organization, 
and the Liberal Project to Reconceptualize International Law, 5 YBIEL I, 7 (1994). 
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The once sharp distinction between the national level, with its developed 
legislative, enforcement, and compliance mechanisms, and the international 
level, where no such mechanisms exist, has blurred. Rather than national or 
international, the process, and the result, have become transnational. 131 
Here, publicly generated national rules combine with a liberalized system of 
internationally generated trade rules to create conditions for privately gen-
erated international rules, which result from debate on both the national 
and international level. These will then be applied as both national and 
international standards and enforced through both national and interna-
tional private mechanisms as well as public interventions. 
The environmental arena particularly exhibits this blurring of lines 
between the domestic and the international, in part because of the global 
ramifications of many important environmental problems,132 and in part 
because the prevention and control techniques used in international envi-
ronmental instruments borrow heavily from those used in domestic laws. At 
both the domestic and international levels, solutions require more than 
action at the level of the state: they require private parties to change their 
behavior by modifying production or disposal practices, installing pollution 
control devices, engaging in planning exercises, changing land-use patterns, 
and the like. Generally, international environmental law harnesses the coer-
cive and persuasive power of the state to obtain these behavioral changes. 
This multi-step, multi-level character makes international environmental 
regulation a particularly transnational activity. 
States, of course, are far from superfluous in the private process. The ISO 
negotiators simultaneously reflect the culture and regulatory climate of their 
respective states and supersede it. Much of the debate over ISO 14001 
between a US-led camp and a European camp arose out of the differing con-
ditions of regulation, liability, and public opinion in those places. A public 
law negotiation would have reflected similar differences. The private process, 
however, is not a simple transposition of "state" positions to the private 
sphere, because the predominance of non-state actors changes the dynamics. 
131 The term "transnational" was first associated with the work of Philip Jessup, who 
stressed that it includes the relations of an economic, commercial, cultural, and social charac-
ter a.cross national borders, not merely interstate relations. The McDougal/Lasswell line of 
scholarship in international law also stresses the complex nature of decision-making processes 
in transnational society. See, e.g., Myres McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy, 82 
HAGUE RECUEIL 137 (1953). As one scholar put it, the international becomes "not [1 a depar-
ture, but [ 1 a continuation of the terrain upon which law participates in ongoing social, cul-
tural and economic conflicts and negotiations." David Kennedy, The International Style in 
Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 7, 28. 
132 Some problems, such as climate change, ozone depletion, and loss of biodiversity, are 
clearly global in dimension. Others, like acid rain, are regional in scope. But even those prob-
lems traditionally considered "local," like air and water pollution and waste disposal, often 
have unanticipated global effects. For example, toxins dumped in local waterways often even-
tually end up in pristine ecosystems thousands of miles away. The difference between local and 
global effects is one of emphasis and degree, not kind. 
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140 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
For example, the reduced degree of public visibility and accountability of the 
private process may cause political and economic positions taken in negotia-
tions to be less aimed at a domestic political audience and to be less subject 
to change depending on the political complexion of the regime in power.133 
Nonetheless, the non-state dominated nature of the standard-setting 
process does not necessarily guarantee adequate representation of societal 
interests. Rather, it can skew negotiations even further in favor of a given 
group-in this case, large transnational industrial producers. The ISO 
process also reflects the increasing ability of transnational business to inter-
vene directly in public arenas when its interests are at stake.134 The domi-
nance of global business concerns in the drafting process raises questions 
about the legitimacy of the process and the results. 
B. Limits to the Drafting Process of ISO 14000 
The ISO attempts to create legitimacy through formal requirements for 
broad-based participation. The ISO's constituent national groups are to 
bring together the interests of producers, users (including consumers), gov-
ernments, and the scientific community.135 A balance of interests among 
these groups is presumably ensured because each national standards orga-
nization is required by its own rules to seek such balance. 136 Other ISO 
internal rules attempt to ensure procedural fairness: comments must be 
addressed, all negative votes must be considered,137 and a supervisory body 
must assure that proper procedures have been followed.138 
133 Note, for example, the divergences in the position of the UK, which in many state-cen-
tered negotiations (i.e. in the European Union) has opposed any expansion of international 
duties of environmental protection. See, e.g., David Willison, Italy: Green Rights for Citizens and 
Strong Community Powers Over Environment Protection-Rome Summit, Dec. 14, 1990, Reuter 
Textline Guardian; and the UK delegation's position in the ISO 14000 negotiations, where it 
opposed watering down the draft EMS standard. The existence and successful implementation 
of BS 7750, a stronger British national EMS standard, probably explains part of the difference, 
as does Europe-wide concern for a standard that can be used with EMAS. But so does the del-
egation's independence from the policies of the Major government. Similarly, the US delegation's 
positions probably would have varied had this been a government-only negotiation. 
134 Some 300 corporations control a quarter of the world's productive assets. Many have 
gross revenues larger than the gross national products of states. See RICHARD J. BARNET & 
JOHN CAVANAUGH, GLOBAL DREAMS 14,423 (1994). On the weakening of state authority by the 
spread of an "international business civilization," see Susan Strange, The Name of the Game, 
in SEA-CHANGES: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A WORLD TRANSFORMED 238 (Nicholas X. 
Rizopoulos ed., 1990). 
135 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, INFORMATION ABOUT ISO (Jan. 
1993) (on file with author). 136 Id. 
137 Negative votes may, however, be rejected as "not related" or "not persuasive." See 
Robert J. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory 
Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1357-58 (1978) (describ-
ing process of ASTM, a constituent member of ANSI responsible for most US standard-set-
ting). According to Hamilton, some consumer representatives felt their objections were often 
rejected on these grounds. /d. 
138 AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE, PROCEDURES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND 
COORDINATION OF AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS 3.3 (1995). 
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But in actuality, all major stakeholders have not been fully represented. 
This was especially so at the early stages, when the basic "architecture" of 
the standards was put in place. Despite the stated goal of balance, the mem-
bership of TC 207 is heavily concentrated in large global industry, industry 
trade associations and consultants, and industry-related government 
standard-setting bodies. The chairpersons of the technical committee sub-
committees include representatives of the Merck and Bayer pharmaceutical 
giants, environmental consulting firms, and national standard-setting insti-
tutes. 139 At the work-group level, where most of the drafting work is done, 
10 of the 16 original conveners came from large corporations or industry 
federations. 14o As late as the May 1994 plenary meeting of the technical 
committee, few consumer organizations attended, and only as "external 
liaisons," rather than participants.141 
In practice, those who consistently attend meetings and participate in the 
actual drafting work decide the content of the ISO standard. The drafting 
committees are considerably less representative than the formal technical 
committee membership, and have been dominated, especially within the 
United States, by large corporate interests. Small businesses and consumer 
and environmental groups have been under-represented. 142 This is so in part 
because the costs of participation add up: recent international meetings were 
held in Australia, France, Korea, Norway, and South Africa. While the 
intent is to distribute the costs of travel evenly, the result is that only 
those who can afford to pay thousands of dollars in travel costs may con-
sistently attend meetings.143 Those tend to be representatives of the global 
139 GEMI, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ISOITC207: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND 
U.S. PARTICIPATION Chart (1994). In drawing conclusions from this list, one must keep in mind 
that although participants were delegated from their corporation to participate in the process, 
they often come from the corporation's environmental compliance shop rather than top man-
agement, and it is unclear to what extent they represent the views, and commitment, of the 
corporation's leadership. 
140 Id. 
141 At some point in the process, nonparticipation by NGOs may be the result of an assess-
ment that the standards will have little substantive impact and thus are not worth spending 
scarce resources to influence. But that result in turn may reflect an earlier lack of NGO input 
into the decisions on the procedural or substantive content of the standards. 
142 These problems seem endemic to voluntary consensus standard-setting. In a 1978 article 
on elaboration of US safety or health standards, Professor Robert Hamilton found that the 
US standard-setting committees suffered from a lack of qualified representatives for some 
important interests, uneven attendance, and a lack of balance on important working groups. 
Hamilton, supra note 137, at 1355. Hamilton expressed concern that standards may have been 
developed with insufficient participation by consumers, workers and small business, and that 
certain non-economic interests may have been given inadequate consideration in developing a 
consensus when most of the participants were representatives of economic interests. Id. at 1386. 
Similar concerns apply in an international context. 
143 Formal requirements for participation in national groups seem minimal. In the United 
States, for example, members of the technical advisory group are largely self-selected: upon 
payment of $250, anyone can request membership. ASTM, US ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TECH-
NICAL ADVISORY GROUP, FACT SHEET (on file with author). Prospective members' names are 
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142 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
corporations who have the most to lose or gain by how a standard is 
drafted. The dominance of transnational corporations is magnified by the 
existence of corporate subsidiaries in a number of participating countries. 
Thus, the same corporate or industry interests have multiple entry points 
into the drafting and decision-making process. 144 
The presence of government, small business, and NGO interests on TC 
207 did improve over time, as word of the possible implications of ISO's 
work began to spread. The Netherlands provided a one-time, two-year 
grant to pay travel costs of under-represented interests and countries, 145 
although for the long term the travel issue remains unresolved. Government 
agencies like US EPA, which had preferred until 1994 to watch the process 
from afar, began taking a more active role. Large, relatively well-funded 
NGOs like the Environmental Defense Fund and Worldwide Fund for 
Nature also began attending meetings regularly. Nonetheless, NGO input 
has been largely damage control, rather than helping shape the form and 
content of the standards. 146 By the time these new actors became engaged 
in the process, most of the basic decisions (at least on the ISO 14001 and 
other EMS documents) had already been made. 
Although it may have happened too late, the private process, once com-
posed almost exclusively of those with a pecuniary stake in the outcome of 
the exercise, eventually began to look more like the public one, with its 
messy and time-consuming, but ultimately legitimacy-enhancing, prolifera-
tion of interest groups. In addition, the proportion of professional lawyers 
and public standard-setters as opposed to technical and engineering per-
sonnel also increased over time. These actors were not simply lobbyists but 
actually sat at the table. This could be seen as an improvement over the 
public process, where NGOs find themselves pacing the halls or relegated 
periodically distributed to existing members of the technical advisory group. Existing members 
must specifically vote to exclude applicants, and this rarely happens. Telephone Interview with 
Gordon Bellen, US technical advisory group member (May 1994). 
144 The technical committee leadership is aware of the lack of balance and the price paid in 
lessened credibility of the final standards, although they see the pro-industry slant of some del-
egations internationally as balanced by the government- or consultant-heavy bias of others. 
Cascio, supra note 79, at 48. In addition, any tendencies of corporate-dominated drafting 
groups toward lax standards is to some degree mitigated by the professional norms of the envi-
ronment, health and safety specialists like Joe Cascio who often represent the corporation. As 
another example, Joel Charm, head of one of the working groups, is the director of occupa-
tional health, in the corporate health, safety and environmental sciences office of Allied Signal. 
145 MARY McKiEL, US EPA, REPORT ON ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ISO TECHNICAL 
COMMITTEE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 2-3 (1995) (on file with author). 
146 For example, NGO representatives reintroduced the idea of the environmental objective 
of labelling programs, which the United States had earlier managed to delete from the eco-
labelling draft. Meeting minutes, Nov. 30, 1995. NGOs were also extremely active in the fight 
to scuttle a Canadian/Australian initiative to create specific management standards on forestry. 
See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
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to meeting sites far from the centers of decision. 147 Moreover, standards are 
more likely to be actually implemented when those industries expected to 
use them are at the drafting table and can take the product back and "sell" 
it to their respective organizations. 
In addition to the predominance of transnational corporate interests, 
another potential problem is the predominance of delegations from large 
industrial countries. Just as in public international negotiations, formal 
equality of national delegations masks functional inequality. The lack of 
timely developing-country input poses the danger that developing countries 
are less likely to find the standards legitimate and to implement them. It also 
creates the risk that such standards, even if implemented, may be ineffective 
in many developing countries. 
In theory, a wide range of countries participate in crafting the standards: 
42 participating-country and 14 observing-country delegations have 
expressed interest in the work of the technical committee. 148 But far fewer 
countries have attended in practice, and fewer still participated actively in 
the drafting and debate process. For example, at a May 1994 plenary ses-
sion held in Australia to facilitate the attendance of industrializing Asian 
countries, only five of 26 delegations came from non-OECD states, 149 while 
15 European states attended. 150 Attendance by less-developed country del-
egations at meetings held in the United States and Europe has been even 
more sparse, although by July 1995 a sizeable number of developing-coun-
try delegations were able to attend the plenary. 151 The most substantive dis-
putes in the technical committee have involved the United States, Europe 
and, to a lesser degree, Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and 
South Africa. 152 Moreover, while most developed countries can send only 
147 For example, the NGO forum for the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and 
Development, and the NGO forum for the 1995 Beijing 4th World Conference on Women were 
both located far from the site of government deliberations, and many NGOs had problems 
obtaining access. See Chinese Government Angers Delegates as Women·s Forum Opens, 
DEUTSCH PRESSE-AGENTUR, Aug. 30, 1995. 
148 BENCHMARK ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING, supra note 56, at Annex 2. QUALITY SYSTEMS 
UPDATE, supra note 77, at SR-IO, gives the number as 43, up from 22 in 1993. 
149 Minutes of Australia meeting, May 1994 (on file with author). 
150 Id. 
151 An unofficial listing ofTC 207 members present includes Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, 
India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand, 
Trinidad-Tobago, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Thirteen European states, Australia, Canada, 
Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Turkey, and the United States also fielded delegations. 
McKiEL, supra note 145, trip report at 7. 
152 For example, a consensus draft on Type I eco-labelling schemes was hammered out in 
May 1994 by delegations from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. June 10, 1994 correspondence re SC3IWGI (on file with 
author); the initial draft of an annex to the EMS standard, intended to overcome US-
European differences, was drafted by a small group consisting of Austria, Canada, Germany, 
Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and the International Chamber 
of Commerce. July 20, 1994 correspondence (on file with author). 
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one or two delegates, about 70 people formed part of the US delegation to 
the July 1995 plenary session.153 
Obstacles to less-developed country participation may include the cost of 
attending meetings, as well as difficulties in obtaining critical documents in 
a timely manner.154 Some participants may also have a sense that develop-
ing countries' involvement would be wasted effort because they ultimately 
will have no choice but to fall in line with whatever standard is finally 
approved. Nonetheless, as word of the potential implications of the ISO 
standards has spread, more and more less-developed countries have 
expressed interest. While participants in the ISO process seem aware of the 
dangers posed by a lack of developing-country participation, concern only 
belatedly translated into action, with developed countries granting limited 
and temporary travel funds for delegates from less-developed countries to 
attend plenary sessions. 155 Remedying the problem, at least in time for pos-
sible revisions to the standards in five years, will require a more permanent 
financing arrangement, better information flow, more attention to early out-
reach among those sectors under-represented in the initial drafting process, 
and the political will of the dominant corporate, developed-country actors 
to enact these changes.156 
Another "process" difference between public international law-making 
and the private ISO process is the lack of linkage of issues in the latter. 
Most recent environmental negotiations (of both treaties and soft law) have 
featured extensive and highly contested attempts to link or avoid linking 
environment and development issues. Thus, for example, developing-
country compliance with environmental rules is linked to adequate transfers 
of resources and technology.157 Such linkage has advantages and disadvan-
153 Of course, in public environmental treaty negotiations many of the same problems and 
discrepancies arise, but over time mechanisms, including travel subsidies and the use of NGO 
advisors for small states, have arisen to ameliorate the problems. To date those mechanisms 
are absent in the ISO context. 
154 A number of delegates from developing countries claimed they did not receive critical 
documents from the technical committee Secretariat before the July 1995 plenary meetings. 
Small and Medium-Size Businesses, Along With Developing Nations, Face Challenges, QUALITY 
SYSTEMS UPDATE, July 1995, at SR-IO. 
155 Support for an ISO mandate to provide travel funds for under-represented states might 
come from the GATT's Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, discussed infra notes 
191-199, which provides that 
Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that international stan-
dardizing bodies and international systems for conformity assessment are organized and operated in a way 
which facilitates active and representative participation of relevant bodies in all Members, taking into 
account the special problems of developing country Members. 
TBT Agreement, supra note 128, at 12.5. 
156 Nonetheless, for reasons described below, industry and industry associations in many 
developing countries have expressed interest in implementing the ISO standards. 
157 See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 31 I.L.M. 949 
(1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994); 1992 United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 31 LL.M. 818 (1992) (entered into force Nov. 1993). 
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tages. It runs the risk of endless deadlock and overexpansion of the subject 
under negotiation, but also allows for wider bargaining. 158 The ISO process 
seems much more limited, both in the divisions and subdivisions of partic-
ipants into subcommittees and working groups with finite mandates, and in 
the technical mantle placed over what is in essence a political as well as tech-
nical process. The narrow scope no doubt allows for faster negotiation, but 
at the cost of potentially ignoring relevant linkages. 
C. Substantive Limits of the ISO 14000 Standards 
The process limitations of the current ISO effort shade over into substan-
tive shortcomings. Perhaps the greatest concerns revolve around watering 
down the standards to a lowest common denominator. The lowest common 
denominator problem results from the consensus nature of the process and 
the need for widespread conformity with the final product if the standards 
are to be voluntarily implemented.159 Although the ISO rules do not require 
absolute consensus, and indeed proposals have advanced to draft inter-
national standard status over the objections of some participants,160 an 
effort is made to accommodate the views of at least the major players. The 
danger is that disputed points will be omitted or papered over, leaving a 
standard with few specifics and fewer teeth. To the extent the standards 
replace or complement other forms of regulation, their relative lack of strin-
gency implicates public policy concerns. It is especially worrisome if the 
standards are being set by those who have the greatest financial stake in 
their leniency. 
As discussed in detail above, the drafting of the ISO 14000 series stan-
dards has been plagued with exactly such compromises. The result is a draft 
EMS standard that is a step backwards compared to the British standard 
that served as its initial template, compared to the European EMAS, and 
even compared to the existing codes of conduct of organizations like the 
BCSD or the CMA. In the area of performance indicators as well, the ini-
tial idea of sectoral measures was jettisoned in favor of more general indi-
cators. Debates were generally resolved by adopting the least substantive, 
least demanding position or the one providing the greatest degree of flexi-
bility to an organization's management. 161 
Studies of private standard-setting in the United States have found simi-
lar patterns. Publicly derived regulatory standards overall tend to be stricter 
than private ones. 162 "Public agencies are more willing than private ones to 
158 See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 82-98 (1994). 
159 See PETER H. SAND, LESSONS LEARNED IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (1990). 
160 For example, the EMS Specification standard was approved by a vote of 28-2, the guid-
ance standard by a vote of 26-3. Minutes, July 1995 meeting, TC 207, SC I (on file with 
author). 161 See supra notes 52-89. 
162 Ross E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
SECTORS 18 (1990). 
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select early compliance deadlines, require use of unproven technologies, and 
regulate in a manner that interferes with traditional notions of managerial 
discretion."163 Precisely these characteristics of much public regulation were 
partially behind industry attempts to create alternatives. It is therefore not 
surprising that private standards would tend to lean in the opposite direc-
tion. 
Of course, the public international law-making process suffers from many 
similar dynamics. Global standards must command widespread support 
because neither treaty ratification nor compliance with rules can be coerced. 
In addition, a principal squrce of debate in the ISO was the need for standards 
to be applicable to organizations of widely varying technological and eco-
nomic capability. This is a common debate in the public arena, as developing 
countries argue that global standards must reflect their particular circum-
stances as well as those of richer states. The solution found in ISO was to 
water down a set of uniform standards, sacrificing content to achievability. 
But that was not the only possible solution. Over time, the process of 
making public international environmental has developed a number of tech-
niques for avoiding reduction to the lowest common denominator while 
allowing for the differing needs and abilities of states. These include 
extended timetables for compliance, provision of technical and financial 
assistance, and recognition of differentiated but equivalent obligations.164 
To some degree, this was at least considered: a European "bridge" docu-
ment, which would be applicable only to those organizations seeking 
certification under both EMAS and ISO 14001, may tighten the minimum 
obligations for European producers. No comparable tailoring annexes or 
addendums will be developed for industry in other developed countries, 
however, nor are there special provisions for small companies or less-
developed countries. The drafters of ISO 14000 seem to have rejected as 
unnecessary any special rules or guidance for small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) or developing-country industry, at least for now. 165 In con-
trast, the European Commission has focused special programs, financing, 
and training on SMEs to foster their adoption of EMAS.166 
163 [d. Public agencies are more likely to consider product bans, and to require immediate 
results. [d. at 153-54, 157-58. In part, the differences are due to the predominance of engineers 
in private standard-setting, compared to that of lawyers in public rulemaking. !d. at 18. 
164 See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 261.L.M. 1541, 
1555 (1987), Art. 5; UN Convention on Climate Change, supra note 157, Art. 4. See generally 
Daniel Barstow Magraw, Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual and 
Absolute Norms, 1 U. COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 169 (1990); SAND, supra note 159. 
165 Small and Medium-Sized Businesses, Along with Developing Nations, Face Challenges, 
QUALITY SYSTEMS UPDATE, July 1995 at SR-9. The drafting committee, with few if any repre-
sentatives of SMEs among its members, concluded that the needs of small to medium busi-
nesses had been addressed. 
166 Interview with Manfredi Bellati, supra note 27; COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNlTlES, LIST OF PILOT PROJECTS FINANCED, DG XI.C.5, EEC Reg. 1836/93, (Jan. 17, 
1995) (on file with author). 
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The lack of input from small business, developing countries, or NGOs at 
crucial points in the ISO decision-making process explains some of the dif-
ference in outcome, as does the fact that the drafters were largely engineers 
and technical specialists rather than diplomats. In addition, the initial goal 
of a single harmonized set of rules that would eliminate multiple registra-
tions and facilitate trade also militated against consideration of differential 
treatment, since any multi-tiered scheme would complicate application of 
the standard. These trade-related considerations reduced the usefulness of 
the draft ISO EMS standard from an environmental standpoint. 
A further consideration in comparing public and private rule-making 
processes is how the two interrelate. One possibility is that the private stan-
dards will be used to stave off further public regulation. Industry's history 
of attempted self regulation in the environmental and health and safety 
fields is a venerable one. For some of the drafters, the ISO standards are 
conceived in this vein as an alternative to government regulation, aimed at 
forestalling requirements that industry perceives as more onerous. 167 For 
some environmental groups, the standards are an attempt to undermine and 
eventually supplant the more demanding requirements of EMAS.168 
Certainly, one possible outcome is that industry will use ISO 14000 
certification or registration to tout its "greenness" while staving off any 
more demanding voluntary or mandatory changes. In the long run, how-
ever, efforts to avoid public regulation through self policing have rarely 
been successful where the content or execution of the private standards was 
found inadequate. Rather, the development of a system of private standards 
showed that industry recognized the existence of a problem and was com-
mitted to solving it. It will be hard to pull back from that position. Indeed, 
if widespread adoption of the ISO 14000 standards results in little change 
in actual performance, that will be a strong argument that more potent mea-
sures are required. The current standards will then serve as a jumping-off 
point for what does and doesn't work. 169 
167 According to their backers, the standards "may, in some countries, obviate the need for 
certain regulatory 'command and control' initiatives." While "some companies will implement 
the standards to project the sincerity and credibility of their commitment to environmental pro-
tection, others will use them to help manage and maintain their regulatory compliance pos-
ture." Joe Cascio, International Environmental Management Standards: ISO 9000's Less 
Tractable Siblings, ASTM STANDARDIZATION NEWS, Apr. 1994, at 44,47. Thus, standards devel-
opment has two objectives: I) proactive-aimed at streamlining regulations, fostering com-
merce, and improving performance; and 2) defensive-aimed at facilitating legal compliance 
while avoiding more onerous mandatory environmental requirements. 
168 Green Auditing: EEB Mounts Campaign Against ISO Standards, EUR. ENV'T, Nov. 14, 
1995, available in LEXIS, Envrn Library. 
169 Oil pollution from ships and pesticide regulation provide examples of this phenomena. 
For details, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International 
Organization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 532-34 (1995). 
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Eventually the limitations of purely procedural standards may become 
more apparent. Many of the initial duties specified in international envi-
ronmental law in the public sphere were essentially procedural in nature: 
duties to exchange information, to notify, to consult, to conduct assess-
ments, and the like.l7° Indeed, one of the salient characteristics of recent 
international environmental law is the drafting of framework conventions 
that set out general, largely procedural devices for periodic meetings, con-
tinuing consultation, scientific assessment, and information sharing. l7l Over 
time, more substantive and specified duties have been added to the panoply 
of international legal tools through these mechanisms. The problem here is 
not simply with the procedural nature of the obligations, but with the lack 
of a clear path to move from the minimal initial obligations to stronger sub-
stantive ones. Nonetheless, a move in this direction may ultimately become 
more feasible. 
V. COMPLIANCE WITH AND EFFECTIVENESS OF VOLUNTARY 
STANDARDS 
A. Potential Uses and Pressures For Compliance 
"Voluntary" standards mean that private companies' implementation will 
be driven by their perceptions of market opportunities and threats, not by 
government regulation. As discussed earlier, however, the voluntary nature 
of the standards is somewhat misleading, as in many cases firms will have 
little choice but to comply or lose substantial market advantages. It is, of 
course, still not known whether the market pressures the drafters are hop-
ing will urge registration and compliance with the standards will in fact 
come into play. While the success of the ISO 9000 quality control standards 
gives grounds for optimism, buyers have a more immediate commercial rea-
son to seek quality control assurance. Environmental assurance may only 
take on similar characteristics if consumers, or governments, make it a high 
priority for more than a narrow subset of goods and services. 
To date, most US corporations have taken a "wait and see" attitude 
toward ISO 14000, participating in seminars and training sessions and 
installing their own environmental management and auditing systems. Few 
170 For a history and description, see HARALD HOHMANN, PRECAUTIONARY DUTIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1994). 
171 See, e.g., 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1529 
(1987), a framework convention that was followed by the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987) and, three years later, by the 
London Amendments to the Protocol, 1990 Adjustments and Amendments to the Protocol 
Adopted at the Second Meeting of the Parties, London, 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991), each contain-
ing more specific and stringent provisions. See also Geneva Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution, 1979 Nov. 13, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979), which was followed 
by the 1985 Helsinki Protocol on S02 emissions, 27 I.L.M. 707 (1988), the 1988 Sofia Protocol 
on Nox emissions, 28 I.L.M. 212 (1989). 
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have expressed interest in seeking formal certification. Developing-country 
industry has been largely enthusiastic, and many companies have pledged 
to seek ISO registration or certification. Given the lack of developing-
country input discussed above, and the undeniable costs of implementation, 
this enthusiasm bears explanation. One possibility is that developing-
country industry is especially interested in achieving the "green" image nec-
essary to sell in major OECD markets, and sees ISO 14000 as a relatively 
painless way to do so. Another is that registration is a preemptive effort to 
head off proposed rules on "eco-dumping."l72 
In Europe, the most immediate question is whether the draft ISO EMS 
standard as currently drafted will satisfy the requirements of Article 12 of 
EMAS. In 1995, the Commission asked the Committee for European 
Standardization (CEN) to develop or adopt existing standards that support 
Article 12, and CEN is widely expected to recognize ISO 14001. 173 The dif-
ferences, outlined above, would be resolved through a "Euro-annex". for 
application in the EC only. This annex, labelled an "informative guide" 
rather than a mandatory requirement (to avoid possible challenges as a 
trade barrier), would contain additional environmental and auditing 
requirements. CEN was to propose a standard to the EMAS Article 19 
committee by mid-1996. 
If ISO 14001 is accepted for use with EMAS, it will no doubt hasten the 
use of the standard among European companies, especially if it replaces 
existing national standards. Nonetheless, both EMAS and the ISO 14001 
standards are designed to stand alone. A company may choose to seek reg-
istration to either one, or to implement them internally, for a number of 
reasons. One was alluded to above: increasing attention to pollution pre-
vention as a cost-saver and cost-avoider. Even if the standards are only vol-
untary, they will force greater numbers of people within each company and 
each industrial plant to consider the environmental effects of their actions 
172 As a result of increased attention to the debate over trade and the environment, acade-
mics, activists, and lawmakers in the United States and Europe have proposed that anti-
dumping laws be expanded to include the concepts of "social dumping" or "eco-dumping." 
See, e.g., International Pollution Deterrence Act of 1991, S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), 
which, had it passed, would have authorized countervailing duties based on the additional costs 
a foreign firm would have to pay to comply with US environmental standards. A lack of ade-
quate environmental regulation or effective enforcement would be characterized as dumping. 
Hence the imported goods would be subject to countervailing duties equal to the amount that 
the exporter was thought to have saved by not having to install appropriate controls. 
Alternatively, the lack of environmental regulation could be characterized as an indirect sub-
sidy which, if it affects export shares would also be subject to retaliation. 
These proposals, of course, beg the question of what constitutes "adequacy" or "appropri-
ateness." Without an international standard, the tendency will be to define these terms relative 
to national regulations, inevitably raising suspicions of protectionism, or at least of discrimi-
nation against developing country exports. See DANIEL ESTY, GREENING THE GATT 156-57, 
163-66 (1994). 
173 QUALITY SYSTEMS UPDATE, July 1995, supra note 165, at SR-7; EC Plans to Bridge Gap 
Between ISO 14001 and EMAS, ENDS REPORT 247, Aug. 1995, at 38. 
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and to take environmental factors into account when planning new prod-
ucts or processes. Because the standards have few substantive requirements, 
such consideration may not lead to changes in industrial design or financial 
planning. However, the timing of the standards dovetails with the rethink-
ing of "industrial ecology" by engineers and planners. 174 A small but grow-
ing number of producers are experimenting with and implementing changes 
in materials and industrial processes to reduce wastes and inputs of raw 
material. Often, companies can justify such changes because they reduce 
costs and increase productivity and efficiency,175 although as the easy 
changes are made, such cost reductions may diminish in importance. 176 
Internally-driven compliance with voluntary standards, however, may 
well depend on a continuing tightening of regulatory standards at the 
national level. The shift to pollution prevention has been partly driven by 
increases in waste-disposal fees due to limitations on dumping and contro-
versies over hazardous waste dumps and incinerators, and by stringent rules 
on water and air quality.177 If a climate of deregulation and a rollback of 
environmental statutes takes hold in major world markets, the necessary 
incentives to seeking alternatives to regulation may dissipate. 
Others may also make use of the standards. Companies might use 
certification or adherence to the standards as a benchmark for choosing 
suppliers or contractors, especially in publicity-sensitive industries or in 
those where ISO 9000 quality-control certification is already a prerequisite 
174 Industrial ecology provides a systems perspective on the flow of materials and energy 
needed to create and produce industrial products. It looks at energy use, material choices, 
product and process design, material and waste management, market responses, and other fac-
tors to design sustainable systems of industrial production. Deanna J. Richards et a!., The 
Greening of Industrial Ecosystems: Overview and Perspective, in THE GREENING OF INDUSTRIAL 
ECOSYSTEMS 1, 17 (Branden R. Allenby & Deanna J. Richards eds., 1994). 
175 See US CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SERIOUS REDUCTION OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTE FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY, OTA-ITE-317 
(1986); JOEL S. HIRSCHHORN & KIRSTEN V. OLDENBURG, PROSPERITY WITHOUT POLLUTION (1991); 
3M CORP., POLLUTION PREVENTION PAYS: STATUS REPORT (1994) (3M claims to have prevented 
177,000 tons of air pollutants, 18,200 tons of water pollutants, and nearly 2.7 billion gallons 
of wastewater from entering the environment, at a cost savings of $710 million for the com-
pany). 
176 See Frederick R. Anderson, From Voluntary to Regulatory Pollution Prevention, in THE 
GREENING OF INDUSTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 174, at IOJ. In addition, the cost considera-
tions involved may depend heavily on the regulatory climate, i.e., high waste disposal fees 
caused by bans on land dumping or injection, and so may not apply where this climate is lack-
ing. 
177 See, e.g., the US ban on land dumping in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
42 U.S.c. §§6901-6992k (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); the strict limits on ocean dumping of 
wastes in the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.c. 
§§1401-1445 (West 1994); the European Directives on bathing water, Council Directive 
761160/EEC, Dec. 8, 1975, OJ 1976 L 31, p. 1, and on drinking water, Council Directive 
76/440/EEC, June 6, 1975, OJ 1975 L 194, p. 26; and the Basel Convention on Hazardous 
Wastes, Mar. 22, 1989,28 I.L.M. 649 (1989), which prohibits the transfer of hazardous waste 
from OECD to non-OECD countries. 
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to entryP8 Companies may find themselves with little choice about com-
plying if a major competitor is advertising its compliance. Banks and insur-
ance companies may require corporate clients to implement EMS and 
auditing systems to reduce their own potential exposure for environmental 
harms, at least in states where environmental liability is a major riskp9 
They may also require specific environmental insurance in risk-prone indus-
tries. The premiums for such insurance may be pegged to environmental 
performance and may be unavailable in particularly damaging or risky 
industries. 180 
Institutional investors, especially those managing public funds or associ-
ated with "socially responsible investment," may look to certification or at 
least to implementation of EMS and auditing principles as part of their 
investment "screens." Tort litigants may well turn to compliance with envi-
ronmental management systems as benchmarks for what was possible, or 
even customary, in establishing compliance or non-compliance with the 
standard of care. In the criminal area, compliance with the standards might 
influence both state and federal prosecutors enforcing environmental laws 
and judges applying the federal corporate sentencing guidelines. 181 
Governments may use them as a shorthand way of demonstrating compli-
ance with permitting requirements, thus reducing regulatory inspections of 
the plants of certified organizations; indeed, some US states and other gov-
ernments are considering this option.182 Others may incorporate them into 
178 QUALITY SYSTEMS UPDATE, July 1995, at SR-2; Peter N. Grabosky, Green Markets: 
Environmental Regulation by the Private Sector, 16 L. & POL'y 419,429-30 (1994), provides the 
examples of British Telecom, which encourages prospective suppliers to explain their plans for 
improving environmental performance, and Volvo, which asks that suppliers comply with its 
own environmental policy. 
179 See Grabosky, supra note 178, at 436. As Grabosky points out, banks and insurance 
companies may at times require environmentally damaging practices as well, as in the insis-
tence that farmers use harmful fertilizers and pesticides on crops in order to obtain crop insur-
ance. 
180 See Marcia E. Williams, The Corporate Response to Government Institutional Controls 
and Information Gathering, in TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON 
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 84, 87 (Eric J. Urbani et al. eds., 1994). 
181 Bell & Connoughton, supra note 70. Under 1991 Department of Justice guidelines, reg-
ulated entities that perform environmental audits, and those that have "regularized, intensive, 
and comprehensive" environmental compliance programs in effect will be treated more 
leniently in both prosecution and sentencing. US DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT 
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR 3-4 (1991). The US sen-
tencing guidelines for federal crimes provide for more lenient penalties if an organization has 
taken "reasonable steps to achieve compliance with its standards, e.g., by utilizing monitoring 
and auditing systems reasonably designed to detect criminal conduct by its employees and 
other agents." UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL §8A1.2, comment 
(k)(5) (1993). 
182 QUALITY SYSTEMS UPDATE, July 1995 at SR-3. See also Ira Feldman, Escape from 
Command and Control?, ENVTL. FORUM, Nov.lDec. 1995, at 39 (ISO 14000's greatest long-term 
driver could be regulatory applications). 
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voluntary pollution prevention programs like US EPA's environmental 
leadership program. 183 
The standards will generate large amounts of information on environ-
mental impacts of industrial activity. Existing information-based regulatory 
strategies like the US Toxics Release Inventory have proven effective in 
prodding companies to reduce toxic releases,184 yet the Inventory and other 
schemes cover only a small percentage of all chemicals used in industry. The 
existence of data will create pressure from consumers, neighbors, regulators, 
and non-governmental groups for its disclosure. That pressure may be exer-
cised through negotiations with local groups, adverse publicity, threats to 
obstruct future permitting procedures, or as part of settlement negotiations 
with regulators over compliance with environmental laws. 
ISO l4000's failure to require any public access to information on envi-
ronmental impacts substantially weakens the market effects of data compi-
lation. ISO, as noted, contains no requirement for publication of 
information on an organization's environmental performance, requiring an 
organization to publish only its environmental policy. In contrast, EMAS 
does require such publication, in line with an emerging trend in interna-
tional law to stress openness and access to information as fundamental to 
solving environmental problems. Agenda 21,185 the recent ECE rules on 
183 Mary McKiel of EPA suggested that ISO 14000 might be a tool within the EL program. 
QUALITY SYSTEMS UPDATE, July 1995, at SR-S. 
184 The TRI is a reporting system established under the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.c. §§1l00l-11050 (West Supp. 1992), which 
requires US corporations to report yearly on emissions of 320 toxic chemicals above a de 
minimis amount. Many toxics, however, are excluded from the TRI. See Frances H. Irwin, 
An Integrated Framework for Preventing Pollution and Protecting the Environment, 22 ENVTL. 
L. I, 47 (1992). Other US environmental laws, including Title III of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) require companies to provide information 
regarding certain toxic materials they store and emit from their facilities. See also the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§260l-2692 (West Supp. 1992) and the 1990 Pollution 
Prevention Act, 42 U.S.c. §§13lOl-13l09 (West Supp. 1992), for other information-
gathering US laws. 
185 Agenda 21 recommends that companies report annually on their environmental records, 
including use of energy and national resources and that industry adopt voluntary right-to-
know programs based on international guidelines, including sharing of information on acci-
dental and potential releases as well as reporting on annual routine emissions of toxic 
chemicals, "even in the absence of host country requirements." (Chs. 19.5l(c), 30.1O(a).) 
Industry should also provide data to governments, and, to the greatest extent possible, taking 
into account legitimate claims of confidentiality, to the public, on potentially hazardous sub-
stances (Ch. 19.16) and hazardous wastes (Ch. 20.23(a)). Governments should "encourage 
industries to be transparent in their operations and provide relevant information to the com-
munities that might be affected by the generation, management and disposal of hazardous 
wastes." (Ch. 20.14(f). U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21: 
Adoption of Agreements on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. AlCONF. 15114 
(Parts II and III), April 22, 1992. 
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access to information,186 the EC Directive on the same subject,187 and 
numerous declarations and guidelines stress the importance of making 
available to the public as much information as is needed to critically judge 
the environmental effect of activities. 188 
Underlying the market-driven approach is the idea that others will prefer 
environmentally superior goods and services, or at least will avoid environ-
mentally risky ones. That preference will be reflected in increased sales, 
lower liability, and increased public acceptance. But the lack of publicly 
accessible information about actual performance makes it more difficult for 
the market-driven approach to work. Markets can only respond to the 
proper signals if all players in the market have adequate information on 
which to base decisions. Under the ISO 14000 management system stan-
dard, the only signal is the self certification of the industry or firm itself, or 
the seal of approval of an outside verifier. But because no other informa-
tion is available to confirm on what basis self certification or third-party 
verification has been granted, there is no way to verify the verifiers. 
Moreover, the lack of disclosure makes it impossible to check whether mere 
conformance with the EMS is accompanied by any real changes in perfor-
mance. 
The problem, in sum, is that third parties will be using a "seal" of envi-
ronmental probity that represents less than meets the eye. As discussed 
above, compliance merely represents adherence to a set of management sys-
tems, not a preferred or even minimal level of performance. To the extent 
that the current ISO EMS replaces or defers other more substantive efforts, 
its application could be a setback for efforts at industrial environmental 
responsibility. 
186 U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ENVIRONMENT FOR 
EUROPE, DRAFT GUIDELINES ON ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION AND PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKlNG, ECE/CEP124, Sofia, Bulgaria, Oct. 23-25, 
1995. While aimed primarily at public authorities and bodies that have public responsibilities 
for the environment, the guidelines call on states to "encourage entities whose activities have 
a significant adverse impact on the environment to report regularly to the public on the envi-
ronmental impact of their activities." [d. at 1(14). Moreover, "public access to information 
stemming from such voluntary schemes as eco-audits should be encouraged, as should eco-
labelling schemes for more environmentally friendly products." [d. at 1(15). 
187 Council Directive of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on the envi-
ronment (90/313/EEC), 1990 OJ L 158 (June 23, 1990). 
188 Admittedly, most of the treaties and declarations refer to the need for public access to 
information held by governments, not private parties. See, e.g., Convention on Climate 
Change, supra note 157, Art. 4 (inventory of emissions), Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. AJCONF.151126 (vol. I) (1992), 31 
I.L.M. 874 (1992), Principle 10.2 (duty to allow residents of a state appropriate access to infor-
mation). But some specify that industry must provide the relevant data to governments. See, 
e.g., OECD, RECOMMENDATION C(88) 85 OF 8 JULY 1988: PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE 
PUBLIC AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKlNG PROCESSES RELATED TO THE PREVENTION 
OF, AND RESPONSE TO, ACCIDENTS INVOLVING HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES, 28 I.L.M. 277 (1989), 
Others leave implicit the need for the government involved to obtain the necessary data from 
industry. 
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154 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
B. Environmental Management Standards, Trade, and the Environment 
The ISO standards' importance also derives from recent changes in inter-
national trade law that make internationally recognized standards the pre-
ferred basis for national rules. Since 1974, international trade agreements 
have shown a preference for harmonized global standards. 189 With the sign-
ing of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round (GATT 1994)190 the preference 
has become considerably stronger. 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which is part of 
the GATT 1994, covers government regulations on products, like those 
relating to size, quality, or emissions levels. It states that "[w]here technical 
regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their 
completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of 
them, as a basis for their technical regulations."191 It thus creates a prefer-
ence for international standards, and a presumption that international rules 
are consistent with GATT.I92 
The TBT Agreement also now specifies that standards must be "no more 
trade restrictive than necessary" to meet a given objective. 193 Unlike the 
189 The 1974 Tokyo Round agreements included a supplementary agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (the Standards Code) that generally required parties to use international 
standards where they existed. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, MTNINTMIWII92/Rev. 5, Mar. 29, 
1979, Art. 2.2. See Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Harmonization and Trade Policy, in TRADE 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 267 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1994). 
However, that agreement only applied to those states that specifically signed on. Less than half 
the parties to GATT 1948 were also parties to the Standards Code. See JOHN JACKSON, 
RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990). Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome (which set up the 
European Economic Community) calls for the issuance of directives for the "approximation of 
such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as 
directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market." Treaty Establishing 
the European Economic Community, signed Mar. 25, 1957, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958,298 
UN.T.S. 11. 
190 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Apr. 15, 1994), reprinted in 33 LL.M. 1125 (1994). The 
Final Act also established the WTO as a formal institutional structure for the GATT agree-
ment. [d. at 1144. Here, the agreement itself will be referred to as GATT 1994 (as distinguished 
from the original GATT 1947), while the institution will be referred to as the WTO. 
191 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 128, Art. 2.2. The text continues: 
" ... except when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or 
inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance 
because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological prob-
lems." [d. Art. 2.4. Although this qualifier allows states to impose their own standards, it puts 
the burden on them to justify such departures. 
192 For greater discussion, see Jennifer Schultz, The GATTIWTO Committee on Trade and 
the Environment: Toward-Environmental Reform, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 423, 427 (1995). The TBT 
Agreement does not apply to government procurement, which is covered by the separate 
Agreement on Government Procurement. TBT Agreement, supra note 128, Art. 1.4. 
193 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Final Act of the Uruguay Round p. 118, Art. 
2.2. In addition, unlike the former Standards Code, the TBT Agreement now extends these 
rules to so-called "product-related PPMs," that is, process or production methods that have 
an effect on the final characteristics of the product itself. It does not, however, cover non-
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TBT's 1974 predecessor agreement, which was a separate, stand-alone 
agreement that only applied to those GATT contracting parties that 
specifically accepted it, the TBT applies to all parties to GATT 1994.194 
Thus, if ISO's EMS and auditing standards become the international stan-
dard for trade purposes, they will obtain privileged status under interna-
tional trade law. 
Moreover, the new TBT Agreement encompasses non-governmental stan-
dardizing bodies. It commits central governments to take such reasonable 
measures as may be available to them to ensure that standardizing bodies 
comply with the national treatment and least trade-restrictive requirements 
of Article 2 of the Agreement,195 and with an annexed "Code of Good 
Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards." 
That Code contains similar non-discrimination language and generally 
requires standardizing bodies to use existing or imminent international stan-
dards as a basis for their own, and to avoid duplication of standards. 196 An 
equivalent set of non-discrimination rules applies to governments institut-
ing conformity assessment procedures to make sure suppliers actually do 
conform to standards.197 In addition, states are to participate as fully as 
possible in creating international standards and international systems to 
assess products' conformity with standards,198 are to provide technical assis-
tance to developing countries regarding their participation in international 
standardizing bodies, and are to encourage their national standardizing 
bodies to do likewise. 199 
product-related PPMs. See Janet Chakarian, PPMs and the GATT, in OECD, TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENT: PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS 113, 115 (1994). It is thus unclear whether 
an EMS standard is covered by the TBT Agreement. 
194 The sanitary and phytosanitary measures provisions of the agreement, which apply to 
food, crop, or livestock health, similarly generally require parties to base their rules on inter-
national standards, guidelines, or recommendations where they exist, and to insure that rules 
are not more trade-restrictive than necessary. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Arts. 3.1, 5.6, GATT, Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 
316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1382 (1994). These provisions caused great controversy because they 
would ostensibly require application of the pesticide residue and food safety standards of the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission. Those standards are considerably less stringent than those 
of the United States and many European countries. The use of international standards is not 
required if a party can show scientific justification or engages in a specified risk assessment pro-
tocol. !d. Arts. 3.3, 5. However, parties shall "avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in 
the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on international trade." [d. Art. 5(5). This may be prob-
lematic for states, like the United States, where different agencies administer inconsistent 
health-based standards. 195 TBT Agreement, supra note 128, Art. 3.1. 
196 Code of Good Conduct, Annex 3 to the TBT Agreement, supra note 128, at D, E, F, H. 
Standardizing bodies must use international standards as the basis for their own except "where 
[they] would be ineffective or inappropriate, for instance, because of an insufficient level of pro-
tection or fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological prob-
lems." !d. at F. 
197 TBT Agreement, supra note 128, Art. 5. 
198 [d. Art. 9 and Annex 3. 199 !d. Art. 11.2. 
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I56 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Three consequences arise from these trade rules. First, because interna-
tional standards are to be given preference, more stringent national or 
regional standards may be open to challenge by exporting states meeting 
only the weaker ISO standard.20o Second, because GATT rules and sanc-
tions are aimed at states, and not private actors, it is difficult to envision a 
GATT challenge to a private entity's application of the standards. 
Nonetheless, the new rules speak directly to the role of non-governmental 
bodies and put the onus on states to "take such reasonable measures as may 
be available to them"201 to ensure that private standard-setting bodies 
themselves treat domestic and imported producers alike; this may presage 
greater GATT attention to the state role in facilitating market-based mech-
amsms. 
Third, if a government or the European Union incorporates the standards 
into public regulations that affect access to markets,202 the standards could 
be challenged. One possible avenue of challenge would be that ISO 14001 
certification is easier and less costly for enterprises in parts of the world 
where verifiers/certifiers are plentiful than in those places where no accred-
ited verifiers exist and companies must make long-distance arrangements to 
obtain certification. If the cost differential were significant, it might consti-
tute a discriminatory effect on an enterprise in the latter situation.203 
Another possible challenge might be impermissible differentiation among 
companies based on characteristics not inherent to the product as such-so 
called process and production methods (PPMs). Current GATT practice 
does not allow discrimination among imports based on the process or man-
ner in which they were produced or harvested, although a definitive report 
has never been adopted.204 In the most famous clash to date between trade 
and the environment, the United States banned imports of Mexican tuna 
because the fishing method killed dolphins. A GATT dispute settlement 
panel concluded that the import restrictions on tuna caught with dolphin-
destructive methods were inconsistent with GATT because they "would not 
200 As a practical matter, the issue would only arise if an exporter not certified to ISO 14001 
could convince his or her government to raise the claim. 
201 TBT Agreement, supra note 128, Art. 8.1. 
202 Recall that EMAS may, at the time of its revision in five years, become to some degree 
mandatory. 
203 GATT Art. III requires treatment of imports no less favorable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirement affecting their 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. There are excep-
tions for environmental purposes, but they are narrowly drawn. 1947 General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 D.N.T.S. 187, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, Art. III. See 
also sources cited note 205, infra. 
204 The GATT Council has never formally adopted the tuna-dolphin panel decisions, so nei-
ther has direct legal effect within the GATTIWTO system. See, e.g., Kingsbury, supra note 130 
at 1. Most commentators on the issue have criticized the non-recognition of PPMs as at least 
potentially valid environmental measures, arguing that moves toward sustainable development 
require attention to the ways things are produced. See e.g. articles cited in note 205, infra. 
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directly regulate the sale of tuna and could not possibly affect tuna as a 
product.''205 To be consistent with GATT, trade restrictions must target 
imports based on their inherent product characteristics rather than on their 
environmental effects.206 
It is not clear whether a strictly procedural EMS standard would qualify 
as a PPM, but a good argument could be made that implementation of an 
EMS system is a "process" standard even without any substantive limits on 
inputs or outputs. It is also unclear to what extent rules created by ISO and 
implemented through national standards organizations (which generally 
have some governmental members) could be challenged as creating de facto 
discriminatory effects so long as those rules were enforced through the mar-
ket and not through regulation. But even if a formal challenge in the WTO 
is not forthcoming, the very existence of WTO preference for existing inter-
national standards in the environment area may discourage the develop-
ment of other, possibly more demanding, national standards in the same 
subject area. 
C. From Procedural to Substantive Standards 
To date, the ISO draft standards lack specific commitments to emissions 
reductions, source reduction, materials or industrial process changes, or the 
like. The procedural changes they focus on may be a useful first step. But 
eventually, especially as initial cost-saving changes are exhausted, it is 
unlikely that management systems, auditing, and information alone can 
compel sustainable industrial development.207 A shift toward minimum sub-
stantive rules of environmental performance seems inevitable. Several alter-
natives have been proposed, including creating an international body 
205 GATT, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Sept. 3, 1991), Panel Report 
No. DS211R, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1995). The case concerned provisions of the US 
Marine Mammal Protection Act that prohibited imports of tuna from countries that failed to 
take sufficient measures to ensure the safety of the dolphins that swim with schools of tuna. 
See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Precaution, Participation and the Greening of International Trade 
Law, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 43, 67-77 (1992); David J. Ross, Making GATT Dolphin-Safe: 
Trade and Environment, 2 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 345 (1992); Robert Housman & Durwood 
Zaelke, The Collision of the Environment and Trade: the Gatt Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 22 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) (April 1992). 
206 GATT, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 205, at para. 5.14. 
On May 20, 1994 a GATT dispute panel decided a second case on restrictions on tuna imports, 
this one challenging the secondary embargo provisions of the MMP A. That panel also adopted 
a view of GATT that prohibits restricting imports of products based on the manner in which 
they are made or harvested. GATT, United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report 
of the Panel, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994). In addition, a panel recently held that process-
based, rather than product-based taxes, and regulations were not valid internal rules under 
Article III of GATT. See GATT, U.S.-Taxes on Automobiles, DS311R, Oct. 11, 1994 (EC 
challenge to US "gas guzzler" tax and corporate average fuel economy standards). For analy-
sis of the "Auto Taxes" case, see Steve Charnovitz, The GATT Panel Decision on Automobile 
Taxes, 17 INT'L ENVTL. REP. 921 (1994). See generally Kingsbury, supra note 130; articles cited 
supra note 205. 
207 See Anderson, supra note 176. 
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capable of setting substantive minimum environmental standards.208 Others 
propose a convention on minimum standards for manufacturing and pro-
cessing industries that would use waste audits to establish baselines and then 
develop subsequent sectoral protocols.209 The ISO process contains the 
germ of several ideas that could form part of such a shift. This model would 
incorporate participation of actors other than states, private monitoring (or 
at least private financing) of compliance, minimum standards with differ-
ential treatment for small producers, technical assistance, and technology 
transfer. Most importantly, it would focus on producers and products, 
rather than states, as the point of regulation.210 
Many of the proposals for substantive standards conclude that such stan-
dards or protocols should be established by sector to allow meaningful com-
parisons among firms, target the most heavily polluting sectors, and 
minimize competitive effects. Indeed, the idea of sectoral standards has been 
floated during the ISO negotiations several times. Early on, as described, 
several European-country delegations pushed for substantive performance 
indicators by sector, but this approach was abandoned.211 
A second, more controversial sectoral proposal would have set specific 
environmental management standards for the forestry sector. The Canadian 
and Australian delegations jointly submitted the plan based on a Canadian 
Standards Association draft. According to the drafters, a specific interpre-
tation of the EMS registration standard was necessary because of the longer 
planning period and other unique characteristics of the forestry industry, 
which created the danger of inconsistent and possibly arbitrary interpreta-
tions by ISO 14000 registrars.212 
At a July 1995 informal debate on the proposal, two objections were 
raised. Many ISO delegates disagreed with the idea of specific sectoral stan-
dards, at least until the final generic EMS standard had been approved and 
tested. Sectoral standards would undermine the often-made argument that 
the ISO 14000 EMS standards may be used by all sizes and types of orga-
nizations.213 Second, environmentalists faulted the proposal as inadequate 
and misleading. They disagreed with an EMS-based approach to forest 
208 See, e.g., Sir Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 
AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992) (tripartite institution modeled on ILO); Daniel Esty, GATTing the 
Greens, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.!Dec. 1993, at 32 (the Global Environment Facility); Charnovitz, 
supra note 189 (institution modeled on ILO). 
209 Gareth Porter, Environmental and Energy Study Institute, Multilateral Agreement on 
Minimum Standards for Manufacturing and Processing Industries (July 1994) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
210 The contours of this model are sketched out in greater detail in Roht-Arriaza, Shifting 
the Point of Regulation, supra note 169, at part VI. 
211 See discussion supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
212 Industry-Specific Requirements Questioned, QUALITY SYSTEMS UPDATE, July 1995, at SR-
II. 
213 Id. 
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management, which included no mandatory measurable indicators of forest 
sustainability and merely certified the operability of a management system. 
They charged that it would lead to certification of companies that contin-
ued to engage in destructive practices on the ground, but that could then 
sell their products as having been "eco-certified."214 In addition, a purely 
procedural standard would undermine existing more substantive efforts to 
create sustainable timber schemes. The proposal was withdrawn when it 
became clear that it would lose on a vote, but it may be reintroduced in 
1996.215 
Sector-wide voluntary standards that include more or less substantive 
obligations already exist in certain industries, generally those with high pub-
lic visibility and a limited number of participants.216 In addition, the 
Netherlands has pioneered negotiated covenants between government and 
industry, which can either complement or take the place of mandatory leg-
islation. Such covenants may commit either an industry association or indi-
vidual industries, and are enforceable through civil law. They have been 
used to reduce the quantity of phosphates in surface water, to reduce air 
emissions, and to reduce discharges by the packaging, graphics, metallurgy, 
dairy, and chemical industries.217 Denmark and the Flemish region of 
Belgium have passed laws allowing for public enforcement and sanctions 
based on such negotiated agreements.218 The European Commission is dis-
cussing region-wide negotiated agreements on a company or sectoral 
level.219 In the United States, several companies have entered into substan-
tive "good neighbor agreements" wherein they agree to local community 
participation in, and review of, environmental audits as well as substantive 
changes in operations.22o 
214 For a detailed critique of the Canadian draft standard that was the basis of the proposal 
to ISO, see Michelle Swenarchuk, Canadian Environmental Law Association, An Environ-
mentalist and First Nations Response to the Canadian Standards Association Proposed 
Certification System for Sustainable Forest Management (Nov. 1995) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). 
215 Quality Systems Update, supra note 77. 
216 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 17-22 (the chemical industry's Responsible Care 
initiative). 
217 Policy of Negotiating Environmental Pacts With Industry to Continue, Government Says, 
INT'L ENV'T REP., March 23, 1994, at 274; Rob Gerits & Jules Hinssen, Environmental Covenant 
for the Oil and Gas producing Industry: A Valuable Policy Instrument?, 24/6 ENVTL. POL'y & L. 
323 (1994); Niels S.F. Koeman, Bilateral Agreements Between Government and Industry in 
Dutch Environmental Law, 2 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 165 (1993). 
218 Jesper Jorgensen, supra note 11. 
219 !d.; see also European Commissioner for Environment Ritt Bjerregaard, speech at 
UNICE Seminar, Brussels, Belgium (Mar. 28, 1995) (on file with author). 
220 See Sanford Lewis, Precedents for Corporate Community Compacts and Good Neighbor 
Agreements (The Good Neighbor Project, Waverly, Mass.), 1995 (on file with author). 
Companies include Unocal Oil in California and Rhone Poulenc in Texas. Often, agreement 
comes as a response to local opposition to legal permits for continuing or expanded opera-
tions.Id. 
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On an international level, the World Bank's recently revised Industrial 
Pollution Prevention and Abatement guidelines set out substantive emis-
sions and design guidelines for Bank-funded industrial facilities projects, 
including a number that are sector-specific.221 For example, the guidelines 
specify emissions limits for fossil fuel thermal power plants and for pollu-
tants from mining operations. OECD states recently agreed on a plan of 
action to eliminate the use of lead, including phasing out lead in gasoline 
and paint and encouraging industry to find substitutes for a range of lead-
bearing products.222 These precedents and proposals could serve as build-
ing blocks for a substantive set of international voluntary agreements. ISO 
or an organization like it might playa positive role with adequate changes 
to include small business, environmental and consumer groups, and less-
developed countries more fully in negotiations from the start. Although 
nongovernmental actors currently play an important role in treaty negotia-
tions, that role is generally informal and excludes the ability to vote.223 
Admittedly, increasing the number of actors at the negotiating table makes 
for more complex and extended negotiations. But the result would be more 
broadly representative, and hence legitimate, than entrusting the task to 
states alone or to an international civil service. 
Under a more substantive standard, an environmental impacts register 
could be used to set baselines for environmental protection. The standards 
would set minimum or maximum levels for items such as energy and 
resource use, emissions, disposal and reuse obligations, use of certain dam-
aging substances or processes, and protection of biological resources, local 
communities, and sensitive areas. 
Organizations complying with the standards would seek certification; 
alternatively, goods produced within the guidelines would seek eco-Iabels. 
Compliance could be monitored and enforced through a combination of 
third-party certification and self certification for smaller producers com-
bined with random third-party checks. Self certification would reduce the 
burden on small and medium enterprises. Such a certification scheme would 
help alleviate the current lack of public resources for enforcement of envi-
221 The guidelines, issued in August 1995, will replace a 1988 set of guidelines. Among the 
notable changes are a new emphasis on pollution prevention, industry-specific guidelines for 
thermal power projects, monitoring requirements, and the like. The guidelines apply to all pro-
jects in the pre-appraisal stage of World Bank or International Finance Corporation financ-
ing, and were developed together with the United Nations Environment Programme and the 
UN Industrial Development Organization. See Anne Goodwin, World Bank Environmental 
Guidelines Made Stricter, Focus More on Prevention," 18 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 604 (1995). 
The guidelines were issued to be used with the Bank's environmental assessment procedures, 
now set out at draft OP/BP 4.01. 
222 Marlise Simons, Rich Nations Urge Action to Cut Danger From Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
23, 1996, at AS, col. 1. 
223 SUSSKIND, supra note 158. See also Philippe Sands, The Environment, Community and 
International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393 (1989). 
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ronmental obligations at both the national and international level.224 As 
austerity programs continue and budget constraints tighten in both devel-
oped and developing countries, the public sector will be less able to provide 
the resources necessary to enforce producers' environmental obligations, 
leaving the private sector as the only viable source of funding. A third-party 
certification system, like that used under the ISO 9000 process and con-
templated under EMAS, would allow the costs of monitoring compliance 
to fall directly on the producers.225 
This proposal would require rules for certifiers, strict checks, regular 
quality control over certifying bodies, and the development of a uniform 
certifying methodology.226 Even better, private certifiers could work in con-
junction with environment ministry officials, thus combining technical assis-
tance with a financing mechanism that does not further burden either poor 
countries or international organizations.227 
A powerful, yet controversial extension of such a scheme would make 
certification a basis for preferential treatment in international trade. 
Domestically, certified goods could obtain preferential tax treatment. As a 
corollary, goods from certified producers would enter under special pref-
erences or at lower tariff rates. Certification would allow goods that 
appear identical but are produced through different methods to be 
classified differently under tariff schemes. When tariff rates are already so 
low that preferential access would provide no benefit, the converse rule 
could obtain: goods from non-certified producers would face higher taxes 
and tariffs. This system would allow distinctions among producers based 
on production methods as well as products themselves. As such, it would 
admittedly violate current GATT jurisprudence on production and process 
methods, and so could not be implemented without a change in that 
jurisprudence.228 Moreover, developing-country governments might con-
strue such attempts as yet another scheme to limit their exports. Technical 
224 See, e.g., Joseph G. Block & Andrew R. Herrup, The Environmental Aspects of NAFTA 
and Their Relevance to Possible Free Trade Agreements Between the United States and 
Caribbean Nations, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 13-15 (1994) (failure of environmental protection in 
Caribbean nations); Esty, supra note 172, at 156-57 (failure of developing countries to protect 
environment due to lack of resources, technical ability). 
225 See supra text accompanying note 40 (use of third party certifiers in ISO 9000), and notes 
26-17 (EMAS). 
226 See Thurston, supra note 41, regarding negotiations for the development of a uniform 
certifying methodology under ISO 9000. Similar efforts will be required under ISO 14000, as 
well as of any other system that relies on private certifiers. A draft standard for qualifications 
of environmental auditors was approved for voting in July 1995. See supra note 77 and accom-
panying text. 
227 The United Nations' UNIDO Clean Production centers provide technical assistance to 
developing country industries in environmentally superior production techniques, but they are 
also understaffed and underfunded. UN Industrial Development Organization, National 
Cleaner Production Centres, Vienna, Austria (Oct. 1994). 
228 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
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162 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
and financial assistance for small and medium domestic industry might 
blunt that opposition. 
Nonetheless, a producer or product-based scheme harnessing interna-
tional trade would have a number of advantages. It would avoid penalizing 
environmentally responsible firms through multilateral or unilateral trade 
restrictions just because other firms located in the same place caused the 
state to violate its international responsibilities or to incur international 
sanctions.229 It would allow differentiation based on the real abilities of 
firms to comply with high standards of protection, not on the artificial cri-
terion of whether the firm was located in a developing state.230 Thus, it 
would hold Mitsubishi or IBM to the same high standard whether their 
plants happened to be located in Thailand or Japan, while allowing for flexi-
bility with respect to smaller producers. Consequently, global corporations 
would have less incentive to avoid responsibility for their environmental 
actions by shifting production from one state to another.231 There would 
also be less incentive for states to unilaterally decide to exclude or tax goods 
from certain countries based on a perception of the unfair competitive 
advantages created by "eco-dumping." Rather than the legislation of the 
importing country serving as the benchmark against which to measure the 
adequacy of national environmental legislation, an ISO-negotiated set of 
rules could provide a global standard. 
229 For example, sanctions such as trade penalties, loss of development financing, or public 
opprobrium, inure to the state as a whole. Thus, when Mexican tuna fishing boats killed too 
many dolphins, the United States barred imports of all tuna from Mexico, even though some 
of the Mexican tuna boats probably carefully avoided killing dolphins. See US Marine 
Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.c. §1371(a)(2) (1990) (prohibiting on tuna imports from coun-
tries without appropriate certification regarding dolphin mortality). Under this regime, the 
hope is that a state will regulate, fine, embarrass, or otherwise pressure its recalcitrant domes-
tic producers into line. If it does not, there is little else states can do against the specific group 
of offending producers. International adjudication and sanctioning mechanisms remain largely 
unused in the environmental area. 
230 The use of the criterion of plant location rather than ownership of capital to determine 
how benefits for developing countries are determined has proven problematic in other areas. 
For example, studies of the Generalized System of Preferences system of preferential tariff 
treatment for developing countries have shown that many of the benefits actually accrue to the 
local subsidiaries of global corporations, with few multiplier effects in the local economy. 
231 Admittedly, any criteria for differentiation-whether it be national versus global capital, 
or size of the plant/enterprise-will raise problems of definition at the margins and might lead 
to unwanted avoidance behavior on the part of firms. For example, if global or transnational 
corporations were expected to comply with stricter standards than national producers, joint 
ventures and shell corporations of all sorts might arise. If size were the relevant criterion, i.e., 
if some requirements had a "small and medium enterprise" exception, one might expect to find 
large conglomerates broken down into a large number of smaller, yet interlocking, enterprises. 
Any type of differential obligations will run into these boundary problems, yet they do not 
seem severe enough to invalidate the idea. On avoidance behavior by regulated entities, see 
generally Cass Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 CHI.-KENT L.R. 407 (1990). 
 at H
astings College of the Law
 on June 16, 2016
http://yielaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
ARTICLES 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Under certain conditions, private, voluntary standards may play a useful 
role. Such standards, if substantive, sector-specific, and created through a 
more inclusive process, may prove more easily monitored and enforced 
through market mechanisms than through an international regulatory 
agency. Such standards will never replace public rules-indeed, they can 
only exist within a context created by public law-but they could pave the 
way for future publicly generated rules. The current ISO process, while 
deeply flawed, contains the germs of a number of good ideas. And it reflects, 
for better or for worse, the increasing complexity and multi-dimensionality 
of international environmental lawmaking. 
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